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Abstract
This paper examines the role of legislatures and how judicial review can
prompt legislative activity. In the national security arena, more emphasis tends to
be placed on the dangers of judicial activity—understood as judicial activism—
without adequate acknowledgement of the fact that judicial avoidance can be
equally “activist” and can have an impact on the political process.
Post 9/11, facing a similar challenge, and relying on similar constitutional,
institutional, and normative principles, the courts in the United States and United
Kingdom made different choices, in large part due to distinct conclusions about
appropriate institutional roles. Where the courts remained inactive, the U.S., the
legislature made no changes to the legal framework authorizing executive power.
Where the courts exercised some scrutiny and pointed out constitutional flaws, the
U.K., the legislature made some attempts to remedy those faults and make more
constitutionally conscious choices. Judicial timidity can encourage legislative
disengagement, especially when the challenged action arises in a constitutionally
fraught area where the impacted population has no political voice.
Ultimately, such judicial and legislative disengagement significantly
compromises the proper functioning of the separation of powers. On June 10, 2019,
the U.S. Supreme Court denied cert in the case of Moath al-Alwi, a man detained
at Guantanamo since 2002, continuing a decade-long trend of disengagement. As
we near the twenty-year anniversary of 9/11, it may be time to consider what form
of judicial engagement may prompt better legislative engagement, thereby
revitalizing the proper functioning of the separation of powers, in the service of
constitutional governance.
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I. Introduction

There is a common refrain in U.S. legal scholarship that an assertive
exercise of judicial power in matters of national security jeopardizes established
institutional arrangements. In war and national security, the executive takes the
lead, with some legislative oversight. 1 The legislative branch is constitutionally
empowered and institutionally suited to check executive excesses in war and
national security. The argument tends to go something like this: robust judicial
review that thoroughly engages with the substance of executive power and decision
making in national security is likely to impose unworkable limits on executive
power, thereby compromising security and legitimate exercises of executive
power.2 What is more, when courts take the reins, the legislature is pushed out, or
loses the incentive to act and provide political checks on executive power. 3 Judicial
1

See Neal Katyal, Stochastic Constraint, 126 HARV. L. REV. 990, 1002 (2013) (reviewing JACK
GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 (2012))
(“Because of their aforementioned competence limitations, they will often stay on the sidelines of
national security disputes. But when they do get involved, they may overreact in ways that could
last for generations due to stare decisis.”); Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held? Military
Detention Through the Habeas Lens, 52 B.C. L. REV. 769, 856 (2011) (“[L]egislative rulemaking
as a general proposition is more easily revisited than rules derived through the habeas process . . .
Judicially crafted rules are not so readily altered, however.”); Mark V. Tushnet, Policy Distortion
and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 94
MICH. L. REV. 245, 245; Similar institutional claims can be found in U.K. jurisprudence and
scholarship. Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman [2003] 1 AC 153 [63]
(Hoffmann LJ) (“I wrote this speech some three months before the recent events in New York and
Washington. They are a reminder that in matters of national security, the cost of failure can be high.
This seems to me to underline the need for the judicial arm of government to respect the decisions
of ministers of the Crown on the question of whether support for terrorist activities in a foreign
country constitutes a threat to national security. It is not only that the executive has access to special
information and expertise in these matters. It is also that such decisions, with serious potential results
for the community, require a legitimacy which can be conferred only by entrusting them to persons
responsible to the community through the democratic process.”); Lord Hoffmann, The COMBAR
Lecture 2001: Separation of Powers, 7 JUD. REV. 137, 144 (2002) (“[A] degree of political
awareness from judges, the ability to identify cases in which behind the formal structure of legal
reasoning with which judges are so familiar, there lie questions of policy which are more
appropriately decided by the democratically elected organs of the state. And it requires a degree of
restraint on the part of the judges; a willingness to stand back from the thickets of the law and accept
that judges are not appointed to set the world to rights.”).
2
See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L REV. 2047, 2051-52, 2086 (2005); John C. Yoo, Judicial Review and the
War on Terrorism, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 427, 440 (2003); Robert Bork & David Rivkin Jr., A
War the Courts Shouldn’t Manage, WASH. POST A17 (Jan. 21, 2005).
3
See Mark V. Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV.
2673, 2680 (2005) (“Further, if courts purport to police the policymaking process but actually
supervise it with an extremely loose hand, the negative case asserts that the judicial-review
mechanism might worsen the political branches’ performance because their members might
mistakenly believe that the courts will bail the people out of whatever trouble the political branches
make.”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663,
2666 (2005) (“[T]he AUMF is best taken, by its very nature, as an implicit delegation to the
President to resolve ambiguities as he (reasonably) sees fit. This position tracks Congress’s likely
expectations, to the extent that they exist; it also imposes exactly the right incentives on Congress,
by requiring it to limit the President’s authority through plain text if that is what it wishes to do.”).
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engagement leads to legislative disengagement. Political checks, provided by the
legislative branch, are constitutionally and institutionally appropriate for this
context, where our knowledge of what is possible, both practically and legally, is
evolving constantly and rapidly. 4 Where the law needs to be responsive to the
demands of unstable and varying circumstances, reliance on the judicial branch—
the institution least able to change its rules quickly in the face of multi-dimensional
problems of security and intelligence—is misguided and dangerous. This line of
reasoning is concerned with the consequences of judicial activity and willing to
forgo searching scrutiny by appealing to and relying on legislative checks. It has
come to dominate U.S. jurisprudence. 5 Even scholars arguing for a robust
application of judicial review and an extension of substantive legal limits and
protections in the national security arena place little emphasis on institutional
interplay.6
This Article argues for a more nuanced understanding of institutional
competence and interplay in national security. A more nuanced understanding
would ensure overlap of institutional authorities is not confused with conflation of
those authorities. An either/or approach to checking executive power and
dominance in national security, rooted in either extension of judicial supremacy or
popular constitutionalism,7 fails to adequately consider and value institutional
interplay. There is value in substantive judicial review of executive decisionmaking in national security beyond the judicial protection of individual rights. If
judicial review can prompt more substantive legislative engagement, then there is
a systemic value to substantive judicial engagement.
The focus in this Article is two-fold. First, this Article addresses the role of
the legislature and the importance of legislative engagement for effective checks
See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 882 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Brown, J., concurring) (“[T]he
circumstances that frustrate the judicial process are the same ones that make this situation
particularly ripe for Congress to intervene pursuant to its policy expertise, democratic legitimacy,
and oath to uphold and defend the Constitution. These cases present hard questions and hard choices,
ones best faced directly.”).
5
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 224 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The
provisions of the Constitution which confer on the Congress and the President powers to enable this
country to wage war are as much part of the Constitution as provisions looking to a nation at
peace.”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 603–610, 635 (1952); Al-Bihani,
590 F.3d at 871 (deferring to Congress and the President to establish the substantive laws of war
that inform detention authority); Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, 35 F.Supp.3d 56, 78–79 (D.D.C. 2014);
Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1860 (2017); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 2408–2410 (2018).
6
See David Cole, Rights Over Borders: Transnational Constitutionalism and Guantanamo Bay,
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 2007–2008, at 47, 56–61; See generally, DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE
CONSTITUTION OF LAW: LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY (2006) (focusing on substantive bill
of rights protections rather than institutional benefits); see generally Ryan Goodman and Derek
Jinks, Replies to Congressional Authorization: International Law, U.S. War Powers, and the Global
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L REV. 2653 (2005) (focusing on the substantive limits provided by
Laws of Armed Conflict on executive power authorized through congressional authorization, rather
than the institutional benefits of robust judicial review).
7
For a discussion of judicial supremacy and popular constitutionalism, see generally Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Judicial Supremacy, Departmentalism, and the Rule of Law in a Populist Age, 96 TEX.
L. REV. (2018).
4
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on executive discretion and the proper functioning of separation of powers. Second,
it consider how judicial review can prompt legislative activity. 8 In the national
security arena, the dangers of judicial activity, understood as judicial activism, are
often emphasized without adequate acknowledgement of the fact that judicial
avoidance can be equally activist and impact the political process.9 Judicial timidity
can facilitate legislative disengagement, especially when the challenged action
arises in a constitutionally fraught area where the impacted population has no
political voice. Ultimately, such judicial and legislative disengagement
significantly compromises the proper functioning of the separation of powers. 10
This Article focuses on U.S. and U.K. experiences in order to challenge,
through specific examples, the stated or assumed claim that judicial review of
matters of national security is undesirable and inadvisable. Judicial review can
prompt better legislative oversight of executive action. U.S. and U.K. experiences
present two different examples of judicial and legislative behavior. Facing a similar
challenge, and relying on similar constitutional, institutional, and normative
principles, the courts in these jurisdictions made different choices.
Correspondingly, the legislatures in these two jurisdictions made different choices.
In the United States, where the courts remained inactive/deferential, the legislature
made no changes to the legal framework authorizing executive power. As this
Article will show, U.S. courts deferred, adopting substantive, procedural, and
evidentiary standards that rendered judicial review little more than a rubber stamp
of executive policy. In turn, Congress could, and did, fail to set any real standards
for executive detention authority. In contrast, in the United Kingdom, where the
courts exercised some scrutiny, pointing out constitutional flaws, the legislature
made some attempts to remedy those faults and make more constitutionally
conscious choices. Given the fundamental nature of the right at stake, the right to
liberty and security,11 U.K. courts understood themselves to be constitutionally and
institutionally responsible for exercising real scrutiny of executive judgement. In
their case, a proper exercise of judicial power prompted legislative engagement and
produced a more effective functioning of the separation of powers, one in which
the legislature engaged with the substantive standards and issues at stake.
First, this Article will lay out the initial legislative authorization of
executive power in each jurisdiction and the judicial scrutiny that followed. Then,
it will explain why focusing on these jurisdictions is fitting and how the difference
in judicial review presents an opportunity to examine the relationship between
8

See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 246–7. See generally J MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL
DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM (2004).
9
Stephen Sedley, The Sound of Silence: Constitutional Law without a Constitution 110 L.Q. REV.
270, 284 (1994).
10
See Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119
YALE L.J. 140, 144 (2009) (“Once a duty shared by Congress and the President, the task of
concluding international agreements has come to be borne almost entirely by the President alone.”);
see also Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control over International Law, 131
HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1272–9 (2018).
11
See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 5,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter Convention].
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judicial review and subsequent legislative engagement. The Article will turn to the
question of legislative development of the legal framework and what that
development, or lack thereof, means for separation of powers in national security.
As the examination of these two jurisdictions will show, the assumption that
judicial activity is dangerous to proper functioning of separation of powers, in
national security, is faulty, rooted in broad generalizations about institutional roles
and a simplistic understanding of institutional dynamics.
II. Legislative Activity, Judicial Review and Institutional Interdependence: U.S.
and U.K. Reponses to 9/11
Soon after taking office, then-President Obama issued an executive order to
close the detention center at Guantanamo Bay. 12 “Instead of building a durable
framework for the struggle against al Qaeda that drew upon our deeply held values
and traditions,” he said, “our government was defending positions that undermined
the rule of law.”13 While confronted with the threat of international terrorism and
eager to safeguard national security, the new president pointed out that the
government had erected a framework of executive powers and policies that “failed
to use our values as a compass.”14 Chief among these choices was the indefinite,
preventive detention of enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay. 15 This detention
was subject to modified, evolving, and ad hoc legal standards and processes. 16 It
raised serious constitutional concerns about the safeguarding of liberty, checks and
balances, and the rule of law. 17 The courts would have to confront these
constitutional concerns in conducting judicial review of preventive detention.
Across the pond, the U.K. courts faced a similar challenge. Following the
attacks of 9/11 and responding to the threat from international terrorism, Parliament
authorized a series of discretionary executive powers aimed at safeguarding
national security.18 However, significant questions were raised about the enacted

12

See Executive Order 13492, Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantanamo
Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities (Jan. 22, 2009).
13
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security, 5-21-09 (May 21,
2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-national-security5-21-09 [www.perma.cc/2EZX-Y4GN].
14
Id.
15
See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
16
Because the legal categorization of detainees from the ‘war on terror’, especially the detainees
brought to Guantanamo Bay, raised significant questions of fit with existing categories under
international and domestic law (e.g., enemy soldier, civilians directly participating in hostilities),
the legal standards were evolving and continue to be unsettled. See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, Who
May Be Held? Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens, 52 B.C. L. REV. 769, 770-71 (2011)
(noting the lack of ongoing clarity on the definition of the category of individuals subject to
preventive military detention); Eric Posner, Boumediene and the Uncertain March of Judicial
Cosmopolitanism, 2007-2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23, 25 (2008) (arguing the Court in Boumediene
changed the law applicable to military detention of aliens).
17
See sources cited infra note 22.
18
See Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, c. 24 (UK) (authorizing detention of enemy
aliens); Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, c. 2 (UK) (authorizing control orders); Terrorism
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legal regime’s compliance with core constitutional principles.19 Detention of aliens
and significant restraints on personal freedom implicated liberty, the rule of law,
and due respect for separate institutional competencies in matters of national
security.20 Like the U.S. courts, the U.K. courts had to conduct review of executive
powers with these constitutional principles at stake.
The courts in the United States and United Kingdom relied on similar
institutional and substantive constitutional principles when conducting such
review.21 It is that similarity that makes the comparison between the two systems
possible, relevant, and revealing. 22 The liberty interests of the detainees and the
separation of powers principles are central to the highest courts’ deliberations in
both jurisdictions.23 In the context of national security, these constitutional
principles possess similar qualities. 24 For example, both jurisdictions have a history
Prevention and Investigation Measures Act of 2011, c. 23 (UK) (reauthorizing but limiting control
measures).
19
See generally Helen Fenwick, The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: A
Proportionate Response to 11 September? 65 MOD. L. REV. 724 (2002); Adam Tomkins,
Legislating against Terror: The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 PUB. L. 205 (2002).
20
Before the enactment of the control order regime, the United Kingdom used indefinite detention
of aliens as a counterterrorism tool. The practice was found incompatible with the ECHR by the
House of Lords. See A and others v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2
AC 68.
21
See AILEEN KAVANAGH, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW UNDER THE UK HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 404–6
(2009); COLIN TURPIN & ADAM TOMKINS, BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION 756–772
(7th ed. 2011).
22
See RAN HIRSCHEL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS: THE RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 19 (2014); Vicki Jackson, Methodological Challenges in Comparative
Constitutional Law, 28 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 319, 324 (2010).
23
For examples of similar doctrines/principles and ongoing contestation over the scope and
interaction of those principles in the United States, see generally Robert Delahunty & John C. Yoo,
The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations against Terrorist
Organizations and the Nations that Harbor or Support Them, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y. 487
(2002); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L REV. 2047 (2005); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assault on the Constitution:
Executive Power and the War on Terrorism, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2006); Owen Fiss, Law Is
Everywhere, 117 YALE L.J. 257 (2007); For examples of the debate over executive power and
judicial review in the United Kingdom, Hoffmann, supra note 1; K.D. Ewing, The Futility of the
Human Rights Act, [2004] PL 829; Dyzenhaus, supra note 6; John Finnis, Judicial Power: Past,
Present and Future, Speech for the Judicial Power Project at Gray’s Inn Hall (Oct 20, 2015) at
http://judicialpowerproject.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/John-Finnis-speech-20102015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GN2B-L3YS].
24
In the United States, justiciability traditionally refers to five requirements the case must meet
before U.S. federal courts are empowered to hear it, including, “the prohibition against advisory
opinions, standing, ripeness, mootness, and the political question doctrine.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 49–50 (3rd ed. 2006). In the United Kingdom,
the doctrine of non-justiciability of national security was, before the passage of the Human Rights
Act, a judicial hands-off approach to any matter concerned with national security. Aileen Kavanagh,
Constitutionalism, Counterterrorism, and the Courts: Changes in the British Constitutional
Landscape 9 INT’L J. CON. L. 172, 173–74 (2011) (“[T]here has been a ‘constitutional shift’ from a
completely hands-off judicial approach (as embodied in the doctrine of nonjusticiability) to a more
hands-on approach (as embodied in the idea of a variable intensity of review combined with a degree
of deference).”).
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of deploying various justiciability doctrines to limit or foreclose judicial review,
but the scope of those doctrines or the application to the ‘war on terror’ context was
unsettled when it came to reviewing post-9/11 detention questions. 25 Both
jurisdictions have doctrines concerned with executive prerogatives in war and
national security, and both measure the scope of judicial power by connecting the
exercise of that power to structural and substantive interests.26 The executive
prerogatives in national security are similarly broad and powerful in U.S. and U.K.
jurisprudence and practice.27 Likewise, the doctrine of judicial review of executive
powers in national security is informed by common principles, yet has been
similarly unsettled in both jurisdictions, especially immediately following the
attacks of 9/11.28 As a result, when the highest courts in both jurisdictions came to
review these powers, their reasoning was bound by comparable constitutional
considerations, making the options available to the courts meaningfully similar. 29
Thus, the different choices the courts made are especially significant and allow us
to consider how they led to a difference in impact on legislative behavior.
Beyond the question of constitutional context, the legislative authorizations of
detention and control powers, and the particular measures provided in the
legislative designs, differ. However, there are fundamental and significant
commonalities between the specific legal frameworks of detention and control
powers operating in these two jurisdictions: (i) the definition of offensive or
25

Id.
See generally A.W. Brian Simpson, Rhetoric, Reality, and Regulation 18B, 3 DENNING L.J. 123,
152 (1988); Adam Tomkins, The Struggle to Delimit Executive Power in Britain, in PAUL CRAIG
& ADAM TOMKINS, THE EXECUTIVE AND PUBLIC LAW: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 543, 547 (2006); Tom R. Hickman, Between Human Rights and the
Rule of Law: Indefinite Detention and the Derogation Model of Constitutionalism, MODERN L.
REV. 655, 655–7 (2005); Adam Tomkins, National Security and the Role of the Court: A Changed
Landscape? 126 L.Q.R. 543, 550 (2010); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assault on the Constitution:
Executive Power and the War on Terrorism, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2006); Owen Fiss, Law Is
Everywhere, 117 YALE L.J. 257 (2007).
27
See A.W. Brian Simpson, Rhetoric, Reality, and Regulation 18B, 3 DENNING L.J. 123, 152
(1988). See generally Robert Delahunty & John C. Yoo, The President’s Constitutional Authority
to Conduct Military Operations against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations that Harbor or
Support Them, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y. 487 (2002); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L REV. 2047 (2005); Curtis
Bradley & Martin Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. LE.
REV. 545 (2004).
28
See Richard Fallon & Daniel Melzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the
War on Terror, 120 HARV. L REV. 2029, 2050 (2007). See generally Aileen Kavanagh,
Constitutionalism, Counterterrorism, and the Courts: Changes in the British Constitutional
Landscape 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 172 (2011).
29
The shared heritage, especially when it comes to the writ of habeas corpus and the central
importance of judicial review and due process, is on full view when the highest courts in both
countries reference the case law of the other, in reasoning about judicial power to safeguard
individual liberty. For an engaged examination of British jurisprudence on the reach and scope of
the writ of habeas corpus see Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 766 (2008). For an example of
U.K. House of Lords referencing U.S. Supreme Court reasoning on fundamental fair trial processes
see Secretary of State for the Home Department v. MB [2007] UKHL 46 [30], [2008] 1 AC 440
(Bingham LJ); Secretary of State for the Home Department v. AF [2009] UKHL 28 [83] (Hope LJ).
26
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suspicious conduct is extremely broad, reaching across the globe and affecting
citizens and foreigners alike;30 (ii) the kind of evidence under consideration is often
secret, second-hand, partial, circumstantial, or contradictory, and the executive has
superior institutional access to, and control and understanding of, this evidence; 31
(iii) neither system justifies this authority on the grounds of punishment, but both
contemplate conduct that overlaps with the jurisdiction of the state’s criminal
justice system and impacts the fundamental right to physical freedom; 32 and (iv) for
both systems, the preventive measures under review can be distinguished from the
detention authority operating in the physical battlefield connected to international
counterterrorism operations (i.e., the detention of captured combatants/suspected
combatants in detention facilities in Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.). 33
At the heart of the legal challenge presented by post-9/11 counterterrorism
detention and control powers is a problem of separating institutional powers. 34
Where, as in this context, the separation of powers is particularly concerned with
(and connected to) safeguarding executive prerogatives and the individual right to
physical liberty, the proper functioning of institutional powers is vital. There are
profound institutional and individual interests at stake. The more engaged the
30

See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV, 1361, 1405–06
(2009); David Cole, Confronting the Wizard of Oz: National Security, Expertise, and Secrecy, 44
CONN. L. REV. 1617, 1619–21 (2012); K.D. Ewing & Joo-Cheong Tham, The Continuing Futility of
the Human Rights Act, PUB. L. 668, 673–74, 685 (2008); Oona Hathaway et al., The Power to
Detain: Detention of Terrorism Suspects After 9/11, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 124, 146–153 (2013);
Jeffrey Jowell, Judicial Deference: Servility, Civility or Institutional Capacity? PUB. L. 592, 598–
99 (2003); A.W. Brian Simpson, Rhetoric, Reality, and Regulation 18B, 3 DENNING L.J. 123, 152
(1988); Adam Tomkins, The Struggle to Delimit Executive Power in Britain, in PAUL CRAIG &
ADAM TOMKINS, THE EXECUTIVE AND PUBLIC LAW: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 543, 547 (2006).
32
See Ed Bates, Anti-Terrorism Control Orders: Liberty and Security Still in the Balance, 29 LEGAL
STUD. 99, 100 (2009); Robert M. Chesney & Jack L. Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of
Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1081 (2008); Tom R. Hickman,
Between Human Rights and the Rule of Law: Indefinite Detention and the Derogation Model of
Constitutionalism, MODERN L. REV. 655, 655–7 (2005); Adam Tomkins, National Security and the
Role of the Court: A Changed Landscape? 126 L.Q.R. 543, 550 (2010); Stephen I. Vladeck, Military
Courts and Article III, 103 GEO. L.J. 933, 968–69 (2015).
33
See, e.g., Maqaleh. v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 96–99 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Robert Chesney, Who May Be
Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the International Legal Regulation of Lethal Force, 13
Y.B. INT’L HUMAN. L. 3, 11–14 (2010); Marko Milanovic, Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg, 23
EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 129–133 (2012); Alberto Gonzales, Drones: The Power to Kill, 82 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1, 17–19 (2013); Stephen I. Vladeck, Response: Targeted Killing and Judicial Review, 82
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 11, 19–23 (2014).
34
Questions of legality, in both jurisdictions, are concerned with both identifying proper legislative
sanction, and then the conformity of that statutory grant (or the executive’s use of it) with
constitutional principles/limits on the political power of the state. See Brandon L. Garrett, Habeas
Corpus and Due Process, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 47, 55 (2012) (“[J]udges provide habeas process
when reviewing whether a detention is authorized, which includes examining whether the detention
has adequate factual and legal support.”); Dawn Oliver, Is the Ultra Vires Rule the Basis of Judicial
Review? 1987 PUB. L. 543, 544 (1987) (“[A]n authority will be regarded as acting ultra vires if in
the course of doing or deciding to do something that is intra vires in the strict or narrow sense, it
acts improperly or ‘unreasonably’ in various ways[.]”).
31
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legislature is in providing a useful and constitutional framework for the exercise of
executive discretion, the more smoothly the separation of powers can operate. This
engagement may not always lead to contraction of executive power. Depending on
the context, executive power may easily be reasonably and defensibly expanded by
legislative act.35 The constitutional problem arises because the executive’s
discretion is wide, raising concerns over the absence of clear parameters by
reference to which legality can be judged. 36 Given the profound interests at stake,
the judiciary is compelled to engage with executive decision-making.
Simultaneously, given the lack of clear articulable definitions available in this
context37, the judiciary is particularly in danger of treading on executive or
legislative ground without clear and defensible doctrine to guide (and justify) the
exercise of the judicial power. 38
This next section lays out the initial legislative authorizations in each
jurisdiction and explains what the courts were confronted with when they came to
conduct judicial review. It also points out the effect institutional powers principles
have had on how the executive interprets legislative grants of authority and on
judicial interpretation of executive practice and legislative policy.
Legislation gives scant guidance in both jurisdictions as to what conduct
brings the individual within the executive’s power.39 A great deal is open to
executive judgement. When the power being exercised impacts the most
fundamental rights of the individual, clear and justifiable parameters are required.
Confronted with the challenge of wading into an area of overlapping powers,
expertise and competencies, where profound institutional interests are at stake, the
courts have two options: they can either step into the muddle and begin to articulate
the legal/constitutional standards, or step back, for fear of overreaching, and leave
the problem to the political branches. As the analysis below will show, U.S. courts
have adopted the latter approach. The D.C. Circuit, with some help from the
minimalist holdings and inactivity of the Supreme Court, has conducted review
35

For example, the War Power Resolution, 50 U.S.C. 1541–1548 (1973), allows Congress to
authorize a conflict and grant the President significant wartime powers. But Congress must
explicitly make the substantive decision to do so. In the U.K context, following rising concerns of
ISIS threats and the fear of returning fighters or new networks within the U.K., Parliament gave the
executive some additional powers, in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 c. 6. (UK),
through control measures, which had earlier been removed for being too oppressive. See KENT
ROACH, COMPARATIVE COUNTER-TERRORISM LAW 752 (2015) (“The Counter-Terrorism and
Security Act, 2015, however, strengthened TPIMs to include residence relocation and travel
restrictions in an attempt to deal with threats associated with people in the UK leaving to fight for
the Islamic State or returning after such foreign terrorist fights.”).
36
See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat. 224 (2001);
Terrorism Act 2000, c. 11, § 1(2)–(4) (UK).
37
See id.
38
For variations on the argument that that tactical, policy and legal decisions involved in national
security are inextricable entangled and should be left to the executive branch, see sources cited
supra note 31.
39
See supra note 35. Both the AUMF and the Terrorism Act in the UK fail to provide clear
definitions of what conduct can result in detention of the individual, failing to set clear
geographical, temporal, and nexus limits on the authority.

12

Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 12

based on a hollow separation-of-powers argument, that asserts the virtue of checks
and balances, but has forgone the responsibility of articulating the substantive
principles driving those checks. 40 U.K. courts, on the other hand, have entered the
fray, identifying the elements of the legal framework susceptible to refinement or
definition according to the constitutional and conventional principles involved. 41
A. A Hollow Separation of Powers and the AUMF
Following the attacks of September 11th, 2001, Congress passed the
Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF).42 The authorization reads:
[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or
persons.43
Due to the constitutional function of this legislative act—authorization of
the executive’s military powers— and the real-world circumstances in which it was
enacted, the act is to the point. It is as broad and permissive as it can be. It does not
provide clear details of how the powers are limited, what acts are authorized, where
the power can be used, or which decisions are immune from judicial review. Given
the lack of guidance within the text of the authorization, the constitutional
arguments that dominate the debate are ones of broad principles of institutional
domains, the commander-in-chief’s powers, and fundamental principles of
constitutionalism, the separation of powers and the writ of habeas corpus. 44
The AUMF is an authorization to use force, to deploy troops, and to engage
in kinetic conflict with enemy forces. 45 The text makes no mention of detention. 46
Yet, the Supreme Court, in its decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, held detention a
necessary incident to military operations and therefore as implicitly authorized by

40

See, e.g., Al Hela v. Trump, 972 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (explicitly severing the suspension
clause and the due process clause when it comes to the rights of aliens detained extraterritorially by
the executive in the war on terror).
41
See infra Sections I(D)–(E).
42
See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001); see also
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
43
Authorization for Use of Military Force § 2(a).
44
See ERIC POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE 4–5 (2007) (arguing for the
special competence of the executive in matters of war and national security); Amy Coney Barrett,
Suspension and Delegation, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 251, 253–63, 292–98 (2014); Samuel Issacharoff
& Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional
Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 4–5 (2004)
(identifying three different approaches to the tension between security and individual liberties).
45
See Authorization for Use of Military Force § 2(a).
46
See id. at § 2.
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the AUMF.47 The Court did not, however, determine the scope of the detention
authority granted to the executive through the AUMF48, and it has been left to the
D.C. Circuit to work out the exact content of the authorization. 49
For over a decade, the AUMF was all Congress had to say about the
substance of the detention authority it granted to the executive. Congress did pass
related legislation, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the Military
Commissions Acts of 2006 and 2009, which addressed issues of Article III courts’
power to review military decisions of detention and the substantive laws applicable
to the military commission’s prosecutions for the violations of the Laws of Armed
Conflict.50 This legislation, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 51 showcase the institutional interplay and how institutional
considerations divorced from substantive rights can hollow out judicial review, and
by extension, pro-constitutional engagement by the legislature. In Hamdan, the
case addressing the prosecution of detainees by the Military Commissions, the
Court initially imposed some substantive law—drawing on IHL and the UCMJ—
thereby prompting Congress to engage and produce a statutory framework for the
commissions.52 On the detention authority, there was an exchange between the
Court and Congress over whether the jurisdiction of the courts could reach the
detainees at Guantanamo. 53 When the Court asserted its institutional power,
Congress responded by trying to limit it. 54 On the institutional point, the Court held
its ground.55 At this point, Congress did not respond by placing the executive’s

See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (O’Connor, J.). This case dealt with the
detention of a U.S. citizen, which infused the Court’s reasoning significantly; the majority of justices
recognized some right to due process in the case of a U.S. citizen. See id.
48
See id. at 516.
49
For more on the role of the D.C. Circuit, see infra Section II.B.
50
See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d at 872 (“The provisions of the 2006 and 2009 MCAs are
illuminating in this case because the government’s detention authority logically covers a category
of persons no narrower than is covered by its military commission authority.”); Military
Commissions Act 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (“(A) The term ‘unlawful
enemy combatant’ means— ‘‘(i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully
and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a
lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated
forces); or ‘‘(ii) a person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, has been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant
Status Review Tribunal or another competent tribunal established under the authority of the
President or the Secretary of Defense.”).
51
See generally Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
52
See id.
53
See Military Commissions Act 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006); Boumediene
v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
54
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 572 (2006) (the court declined to apply the provisions
of the DTA stripping the courts habeas jurisdiction); Military Commissions Act 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) §7 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in response to the Court’s holding
in Hamdan).
55
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008) (“Congress has enacted a statute, the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), 119 Stat. 2739, that provides certain procedures for
review of the detainee’s status. We hold that those procedures are not an adequate and effective
47
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substantive authority on clear statutory ground. The institutional ground the Court
had staked out had no substantive requirements; it placed no substantive limits or
parameters on executive power to detain indefinitely.
In the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Congress responded to the Court’s
decision in Rasul v. Bush extending statutory habeas review to detainees at
Guantanamo by attempting to remove the courts’ jurisdiction. 56 When the Supreme
Court came to consider a related challenge to the military commissions, the Court
pushed back against this removal of jurisdiction, asserting the institutional value
and importance of judicial oversight. 57 Congress responded by enacting the
Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA 2006) and expressly eliminated court
jurisdiction over pending and future cases.58 The Supreme Court again, in
Boumediene, offered resistance.59 But the Court’s resistance was limited to
asserting the judicial interests at stake, as discussed below. 60 It did not set out any
substantive standards for detention authority. 61 It is illuminating to note that in the
context of criminal prosecutions carried out by the Military Commissions at
Guantanamo, where the Court briefly provided slightly more by way of substantive
standards (relying on Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions), Congress
responded by enacting legislation to empower the Commissions.62 But in the
context of pure detention authority, the Court provided no clear holding on what
rights the detainees enjoyed or the breadth of the executive’s detention power , and
the legislature had no need to be more precise with the definition of detainable
conduct or to set clear limits on the scope of its broad authorization.63
Meanwhile, the executive branch conducted detention operations and, in the
process, developed its own framework for interpreting the AUMF and the scope of

substitute for habeas corpus. Therefore §7 of the Military Commissions Act of 2006(MCA), 28
U.S.C. §2241(e), operates as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ.”).
56
See Detainee Treatment Act (2005) P.L. 109-148, Title X; P.L. 109-163, Title XIV (responding
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Rasul v. Bush, 543 U.S. 466 (2004)).
57
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 572 (2006).
58
See Military Commissions Act (2006) P.L. 109-366.
59
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008).
60
For discussion of Boumediene, see infra Section II.B.
61
See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798 (“[O]ur opinion does not address the content of the law that
governs petitioners’ detention. That is a matter yet to be determined. We hold that petitioners may
invoke the fundamental procedural protections of habeas corpus.”).
62
The Supreme Court also abandoned reviewing challenges to the military commissions, leaving it
to the D.C. Circuit to handle oversight. The initial legislative establishment of the military
commissions (MCA 2006) did result from judicial review and engagement with the substantive
issues raised by the executive order establishing the military commissions. The Military
Commissions Act of 2009, which made substantive changes to the jurisdiction and procedures of
the commissions, was largely driven by the election of President Barack Obama. The changes were
not due to judicial holdings. See Jennifer K. Elsea, The Military Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA
2009): Overview and Legal Issues, Congressional Research Service (Aug. 4, 2014),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41163.pdf [https://perma.cc/FA84-54E7].
63
While National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat.
1298, §1021 (2012), did codify the detention authority asserted by the executive, it did not further
specify or clarify the limits of that broad authority.
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the President’s power. 64 In defending its detention policies at Guantanamo Bay, 65
the Bush administration argued that war powers, displaced regular institutional
relationships. Congress has no authority to “place any limits on the President’s
determinations as to any terrorist threat, the amount of military force to be used in
response, or the method, timing, and nature of the response.”66 This conclusion is
derived from institutional claims that “the constitutional structure requires that any
ambiguities in the allocation of a power that is executive in nature—such as the
power to conduct military hostilities—must be resolved in favor of the executive
branch,”67 and that “the Constitution makes clear that the process used for
conducting military hostilities is different from other government decisionmaking.”68 The need for effective and unified action means one branch decides.
The Obama Administration maintained a similar approach, stressing the need to
maintain flexibility in defining who is detainable. In 2009, the Obama
Administration provided the following definition of its own authority to detain
pursuant to the AUMF:
The President has the authority to detain persons that the President
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001, and persons who harbored those responsible for
those attacks. The President also has the authority to detain persons who were part
of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces that
are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners,
including any person who has committed a belligerent act, or has directly supported
hostilities, in aid of such enemy armed forces.69
The Administration followed up on the definitional framework with a
familiar explanation: “It is neither possible nor advisable, however, to attempt to
identify, in the abstract, the precise nature and degree of ‘substantial support,’ or
the precise characteristics of ‘associated forces,’ that are or would be sufficient to
bring person and organizations within the foregoing framework.” 70 Since the
authorization is connected to a vested power that operates in an arena traditionally
and still conceptually entrusted to the executive, national security and international
relations, as provided by the Commander-in-Chief Clause, the executive has
See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, THE REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT’S TASK FORCE ON
DETAINEE TREATMENT, 57–84 (2013), http://detaineetaskforce.org/report [https://perma.cc/JWX2V8RE].
65
Guantanamo Bay houses third-state detainees who were captured either by U.S. forces in
Afghanistan or handed over to the United States by allied powers, most notably the Northern
Alliance in Afghanistan and Pakistani officials, in the early days of the invasion.
66
The President’s Const. Auth. to Conduct Mil. Operations Against Terrorists and Nations
Supporting Them, 25 Op. O.L.C. 188, 214 (2001).
67
Id. at 194.
68
Id. at 193.
69
Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority Relative to
Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 1–2, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, No. 08-0442
(D.D.C Mar. 13, 2009) https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/documents/memo-re-det-auth.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4ZVX-6Y4F].
70
Id. at 2.
64
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claimed space to use expert judgement and institutional competence to decide how
this broad definition applies to individuals.71 The government further argued that
when the particular conflict fits imperfectly with the existing rules and examples of
executive war powers, the courts must recognize that “the particular facts and
circumstances justifying detention will vary from case to case, and may require the
identification and analysis of various analogues from traditional international
armed conflicts.”72 In other words, the executive argued that as existing definitions
and the Laws of Armed Conflict (“LOAC”) have no easy fit with the conflict
against international terrorism, the lack of clear answers requires executive
discretion. The same definition was offered by the Obama Administration in 2016
in a document outlining the legal framework guiding executive national security
operations.73
There is no straightforward legal precedent on the distinction between
combatants, civilians, ‘civilians directly involved in hostilities,’ and individuals
‘part of enemy organizations in the War on Terror. Therefore, there is no
straightforward legal precedent from which the courts can reliably claim authority
to consistently and legitimately limit executive judgement.74 The executive claimed
the sole authority to write the law, to determine who is detainable. 75 But even
without clear existing rules setting the terms of who is detainable in a conflict like
this one, there are governing principles that inform what these rules should try to
achieve, i.e., preventing the detention of individuals with insufficient connection to
the conflict.76 The executive essentially claimed the sole authority to apply those
principles, and the courts have largely accepted that claim.

See id. See also The President’s Const. Auth. to Conduct Mil. Operations Against Terrorists and
Nations Supporting Them, 25 Op. O.L.C. 188, 189–90 (2001).
72
Id.
73
See THE WHITE HOUSE, REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE UNITED
STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS, 28–29 (2016)
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/Legal_Policy_Report
.pdf [https://perma.cc/XWJ4-MWS7].
74
See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 526–27 (O’Connor, J.) (“[T]he circumstances surrounding Hamdi’s
seizure cannot in any way be characterized as ‘undisputed,’ as ‘those circumstances are neither
conceded in fact, nor susceptible to concession in law.’”); The D.C. Circuit eschewed the need to
develop a clear standard to define detainable conduct. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d at 875 (Brown,
J.) (“A clear statement requirement is at odds with the wide deference the judiciary is obliged to
give to the democratic branches with regard to questions concerning national security.”); see also
Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 69 (D.D.C. 2009) (Bates, J.) (“Detention based on
substantial or direct support of the Taliban, al Qaeda or associated forces, without more, is simply
not warranted by domestic law or the law of war.”).
75
See Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority Relative to
Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 1–2, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, No. 080442 (D.D.C Mar. 13, 2009) https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/documents/memo-re-detauth.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZVX-6Y4F].
76
Those principles are drawn from international humanitarian law, as well U.S. constitutional law,
such as the principle of distinction and the right of substantive due process (i.e., the right to
freedom from arbitrary detention). See generally Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion
of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, ICRC (2009); Jenny
S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the War on Terror, 108 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1013 (2008).
71
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It is the subject matter context that links the broad authorization to the
doctrine of interpretation that the government advanced: “When the President acts
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its
maximum” and any action he takes pursuant to that authorization “would be
supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest of latitude of judicial
interpretation.”77 In these instances, presidential war power at its maximum. The
broad claim of authority over the domain of military affairs showcases the
interpretive doctrines, presumptions, and inferences that accompany the
constitutional reasoning on war powers. Separation-of-powers reasoning in this
context is full of generalizations about institutional competencies that assume the
complex and variable interactions of political, legal and expert judgements
involved require judicial abdication. 78 It is a separation-of-powers principle with a
single institution in its sights, the executive. When the courts came to review post9/11 executive powers, they adopted a similar institutional powers approach.
B. Judicial Review without Judicial Scrutiny
How would a clear ruling by the courts on presidential war authorization
have impacted Congress, as it drafted its next statute on the authority to detain? To
fully appreciate how little changed from the 2001 AUMF to the 2012 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA),79 this Article considers how the courts
conducted review of executive detentions during that time. 80 Did the courts identify
or develop rules, e.g., geographic limits, nexus requirements, or standards, e.g.,
necessity of detention, evidence of direct participation in hostilities, to clarify the
boundaries of executive discretion? Did they set procedural standards designed to
ensure unsubstantiated judgements of the executive would not lead to indefinite
detentions? Part III of this Article grapples with the reality that engagement may
not mean better substantive definition of detainable conduct—a key aim of
institutional interplay identified at the outset of this section.81 The analysis of U.K.

77

See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636–37 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 2052.
78
See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assault on the Constitution: Executive Power and the
War on Terrorism, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2006); Ashley S. Deeks, The Observer Effect:
National Security Litigation, Executive Policy Changes, and Judicial Deference, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 827 (2013) (identifying wide deference courts show the executive in national security and
arguing that review alone, however deferential, shapes the executive’s choices); Jonathan Masur,
A Hard Look or a Blind Eye: Administrative Law and Military Deference, 56 HASTINGS L. J. 441,
445 (2005).
79
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298
(2012).
80
Not much has changed since 2012, in terms of either judicial or legislative development of the
legal framework. It is worth highlighting that Congress did act on other related issues up to 2008,
including prohibitions on cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment of prisoners in the
war on terror and setting limits on interrogations and setting out the legislative framework for the
military commissions. See Detainee Treatment Act (2005) Pub. L. 109-148; Military Commissions
Act 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006); Military Commissions Act 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2574 (2009).
81
See infra Part III.
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institutional engagement shows that the legal framework for detention and coercion
can be improved through other means.82
Let us begin with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Hamdi and Boumediene.
The judicial reasoning in these cases provides a good example of how separationof-powers arguments became the main justification for the exercise of review
without the articulation of the substantive principles that review is meant to serve.
In the end, all that the Court’s assertion of institutional checks accomplished was
to proclaim the importance of judicial power; it did not articulate the purpose of
having the judiciary hold the power to safeguard substantive rights beyond
institutional grandstanding. Substantive limits or rights include both the
incorporation of individual rights involved or the articulation of substantive legal
limits beyond mere institutional authority, i.e., strict and engaged interpretation and
application of statutory language or imposition of standards set by international
laws of armed conflict.
Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Hamdi focuses on the issue of legality and
procedural due process. The AUMF makes no mention of detention, raising
significant rule of law concerns. 83 The Court found that Congress had implicitly
authorized the executive to detain individuals through the AUMF. Justice
O’Connor’s analysis focuses on statutory barriers, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), and
authorizations, the AUMF, to avoid the constitutional stakes of the case. However,
by focusing on the statutory prohibition of unauthorized detention, the Court’s
analysis skirts the question of whether constitutional due process of law—a
substantive protection—itself prohibits executive detention under these
circumstances, for citizens and aliens alike. 84
18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) states that “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or
otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”85
The prohibition was enacted to require Congress to define, and hopefully to limit,
the power of detention, thereby ensuring nothing like the World War II Japanese
internment would happen again. 86 The logic of the statute, requiring congressional
authorization and definition, is a favored tool of legal reasoning in national security

82

See infra Section II.D.
See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
84
See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.) (“[C]onsidering. . . the extent to
which, since he is a ‘person,’ an alien has the same protection for his life, liberty and property under
the Due Process Clause as is afforded to a citizen, deportation without permitting the alien to prove
that he was unaware of the Communist Party’s advocacy of violence strikes one with a sense of
harsh incongruity.”). The Supreme Court’s avoidance of the substantive constitutional issues has
allowed the D.C. Circuit to implicitly sever the institutional and substantive claims for the past ten
years, and to do so explicitly in Al Hela v. Trump, 972 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
85
18 U.S.C. § 4001 (1948).
86
See Stephen Vladeck, Justice Jackson, the Memory of Internment, and the Rule of Law after the
Bush Administration, in WHEN GOVERNMENTS BREAK THE LAW: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE
PROSECUTION OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 183, 196 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds., 2010).
83
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cases.87 Underlying the preference for legality-based approaches to national
security judicial review is a compromise that “requiring clear congressional
authorization helps ‘provid[e] a check on unjustified intrusions on liberty’ without
stopping Congress from providing such authorization ‘when there is a good
argument for it.’ Clear statement rules thus tend to ‘promote liberty without
compromising legitimate security interests.’”88 Justice O’Connor’s analysis coasts
on this assumption, that so long as there is authority, and so long as this instance of
detention is obviously within the scope of that authority, all that remains is
determining due process.89
As the AUMF provides no explicit authorization for detention, relying on it
as a legitimate source of broad detention authority raises serious questions about
principles of legality and due process. Usually, statutes, especially laws, that take
away freedom must be general, prospective, and ascertainable. 90 Parts of Justice
O’Connor’s opinion in Hamdi give indirect clues as to what the legal answer may
be for interpreting the AUMF so that it complies with due process, but the lack of
any direct consideration of the matter has produced one of the greatest legal
disputes among American legal scholars over post-9/11 national security law. 91
The writ of habeas corpus and the separation of powers occupied the Court’s
focus in Boumediene v Bush.92 The Court explained that the writ’s historic and
fundamental role was as a safeguard against unlawful and arbitrary exercises of
executive power.93 The court reasoned this justified extending the protections of
the Suspension Clause to those facing just such a risk: “[t]he Framers viewed
freedom from unlawful restraint as a fundamental precept of liberty, and they
understood the writ of habeas corpus as a vital instrument to secure that freedom.”94
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Boumediene says a great deal about the importance
of the judicial role. The reasoning places significant emphasis on the separation-ofpowers values in the writ, and largely collapses the individual rights protective

87

See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 636–37 (articulating a taxonomy of executive power that places
congressionally authorized powers at the zenith).
88
Trevor W. Morrison, The Middle Ground in Judicial Review of Enemy Combatant Detentions, 45
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 453, 468 (2009).
89
See Hamdi, 543 U.S. at 524–533.
90
See Robert Chesney, Who May Be Held? Military Detention through the Habeas Lens (2011) 52
B. C. L. REV. 769, 813 (“[Due process] generally precludes detention other than pursuant to criminal
conviction . . . .”); Owen Fiss, The War Against Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 26 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 235, 235 (2006) (pulling together various constitutional provisions to identify the
principle of freedom).
91
See generally Trevor Morrison, The Middle Ground in Judicial Review of Enemy Combatant
Detentions, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 453 (2009); Stephen Vladeck, Boumediene’s Quiet Theory:
Access to Courts and the Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107 (2009); Robert M
Chesney, ‘Who May Be Held? Military Detention through the Habeas Lens’ 52 B. C. L. REV. 769
(2011); Eric Posner, Deference to the Executive in the United States after September 11: Congress,
The Courts, and the Office of Legal Counsel, 35 HARV. J. L. PUB. POL’Y 213, 224–25 (2012).
92
See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 743–46.
93
See id. at 739–747.
94
Id. at 739.
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principles in the writ into institutional principles. 95 Ultimately, the Court makes
clear it will not determine the substance of the rights these detainees enjoy. Justice
Kennedy wrote: “This design [of separated powers and judicial review] serves not
only to make Government accountable but also to secure individual liberty.” 96 This
language calls attention to the importance of the courts as watchdogs, so that the
political branches do not overstep their constitutional limitations. But the opinion
never offers a substantive definition of what the judiciary is meant to be
protecting.97 The great writ protects a person from being detained illegally, without
clear legal authority. But whether detention is lawful depends on what law governs.
None of the Supreme Court decisions thus far have given clear guidance as to the
substantive scope of the executive power in question, whether it is informed by
international laws of war, federal common law, or necessity. At various points in
the several opinions, the Court seems to imply some involvement of all three, but
it gives no clear articulation of which, how or in what order. For example, the
Supreme Court hinted at but did not hold that the extension of the writ to
Guantanamo meant the detainees would be protected by the Due Process Clause
and thereby be able to test the substantive grounds of detention. 98
When the D.C. District courts took up the Guantanamo habeas cases, they
considered several avenues for developing a legal test that would consider the
liberty interests of the detainees as core interests. Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit
rejected all such avenues. Instead, their judicial review came to rest on broad and
functional doctrines of institutional powers, driven by the executive’s operational
needs. The court’s analysis did not consider the liberty interests of the detainees or
any other substantive constitutional principles. As the analysis below will show, the
D.C. Circuit has, in effect, yielded the field to the executive by avoiding both casespecific balancing of constitutional interests, i.e., evaluating and scrutinizing the
necessity of the measures of the sufficiency of the evidence, and the development
of categorical rules, i.e., arriving at fixed rules or categories through balancing.
There has been no judicial development of substantive standards and no judicial
balancing of interests.
In the beginning, a number of scholars and jurists proposed IHL as
potentially valuable in conducting substantive review, setting substantive limits on
executive discretion.99 For a few district court judges, it proved an appealing

See id. at 745 (“It ensures that, except during periods of formal suspension, the Judiciary will
have a time-tested device, the writ, to maintain the ‘delicate balance of governance’ that is itself
the surest safeguard of liberty.”).
96
Id. at 742.
97
See Stephen Vladeck, Boumediene’s Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the Separation of
Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2144–46 (2009).
98
See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798 (“[O]ur opinion does not address the content of the law that
governs petitioners’ detention. That is a matter yet to be determined. We hold that petitioners may
invoke the fundamental procedural protections of habeas corpus.”).
99
See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 6, at 2653–54; See also Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks,
Replies to Congressional Authorization: International Law, U.S. War Powers, and the Global War
on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L REV. 2653, 2654 (2005).
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source.100 Judge Bates, writing for the D.C. District court, pushed back against the
executive’s use of “substantial support” as a ground for detention, finding a lack of
any positive authority in IHL for this category of individuals.101 This lack of
positive authority in international law, coupled with the real risk that such a
permissive standard would result in erroneous and unjustified decisions to detain,
was a sufficiently compelling reason to limit the executive’s discretion. 102 Soldiers,
i.e., members of enemy armed forces, can be detained until the “cessation of active
hostilities.”103 The emphasis on status rather than individual conduct is the product
of the war context, where dangerousness is determined and justified broadly.
Soldiers of enemy forces, by definition, are a danger to our combat forces. 104 It is
that status that permits their legal detention. 105 The parties in Hamlily v. Obama
drew connections and analogies between the current conflict and the kinds of
conflicts that are the subject of international laws of war. 106 However, while
navigating several sources of law and evidence of practice, the court acknowledged
that “the government’s position cannot be said to reflect customary international
law because, candidly, none exists on this issue.” 107
Once the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals considered these cases, the lack of
clear authority within IHL, specifically for the realities of the “Global War on
Terror,” came to mean lack of judicial authority to impose substantive limits on
executive determinations of detainable conduct.108 Not long thereafter, the D.C.
Circuit abandoned the use of international law, generally, as a limit on the
President’s commander in chief powers:
There is no indication in the AUMF . . . that Congress intended the
international laws of war to act as extra-textual limiting principles for the
President’s war powers under the AUMF. The international laws of war as a whole
100

See Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 77–78.
Id.
102
See id.
103
Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 874 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see also Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (“Al-Bihani makes plain that the United States’ authority to detain an enemy combatant is not
dependent on whether an individual would pose a threat to the United States or its allies if released
but rather upon the continuation of hostilities.”); Authorization For Use Of Military Force After
Iraq And Afghanistan, Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 113th Cong. 2 (2014) (Statement
of Harold Hongju Koh, Sterling Professor of International Law, Yale Law School, former State
Department Legal Adviser).
104
The D.C. Circuit does not address what impact the Supreme Court’s determination that battlefield
captures are excluded from this process should have on the justification of continued detention. See
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534.
105
See, e.g., Hamdi, 543 U.S. at 519 (“Because detention to prevent the combatant’s return to the
battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war”); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942)
(“Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military
forces.”).
106
See Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 72–77.
107
Id. at 74.
108
The U.K. Courts have thus far taken the opposite approach, interpreting the lack of clear legal
standards in the Laws of Armed Conflict to mean the end of executive power. See Mohammed &
others v. Secretary of State for Defence [2015] EWCA Civ. 843 [9], [2016] 2 WLR 247.
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have not been implemented domestically by Congress and are therefore not a source
of authority for U.S. courts.109
The court never considered whether the logic underlying the soldier/civilian
distinction, so integral to armed conflict, ought to guide judicial assessment of the
justification offered by the executive in the current conflict.
With no clear existing rules to apply, the courts had the option of devising
the standards themselves and fixing limits on executive power. To set limits, the
courts would be compelled to provide some standards to satisfy the substantive due
process requirement. The D.C. District Court in Salahi v. Obama did just this,
carefully examining the substantive standard for detention. 110 The district court
took on the responsibility of extending the logic of war-powers detention to the
current conflict and attempted to articulate a standard for justifiable detention that
could provide guidance for the executive and the courts.111
The district court made a reasoned distinction between providing some
support to al Qaeda or the Taliban and being an involved member who is part of a
larger plan and the command structure of a terrorist organization. 112 They found the
latter sufficient to merit detention and the former too imprecise to justify detention
as the risk of detaining people with insufficient links to the organization was too
high.113 In this case, the district court found the detainee may well have been a
“sympathizer—perhaps a ‘fellow traveler’; that he was in touch with al-Qaida
members; and that from time to time, before his capture, he provided sporadic
support to members of al-Qaida,” but none of this proved that he was sufficiently
“part of” the organization to justify detention. 114 This was an instance of the district
court taking it upon itself to provide a definition of detainable conduct/status, which
the courts could articulate, justify, and implement. Once more, when the D.C.
Circuit came to review the case, the legal standard was overturned. 115
The D.C. Circuit found the district court’s searching analysis to have
overstepped into the executive and legislative domain. Given the imperfect fit
between the existing IHL and the current conflict, the D.C. Circuit reasoned, it was
up to the executive to determine whether the detention was justified. The district
109

Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 871; see also Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (denying
en banc rehearing) (Sentelle, C.J.) (“We decline to en banc this case to determine the role of
international law-of-war principles in interpreting the AUMF because, as the various opinions
issued in the case indicate, the panel’s discussion of that question is not necessary to the disposition
of the merits.”).
110
See Salahi v. Obama, 710 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4–5 (D.D.C. 2010).
111
See id. at 4–6.
112
See id. at 15–16.
113
See id. at 12 (“The government has not credibly shown Salahi to have been a ‘recruiter.’ What
its evidence shows is that Salahi remained in contact with people he knew to be al-Qaida members”).
114
Id. at 16.
115
See Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 746 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see also Al Hela v. Trump, 972 F.3d
120, 130–35 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (rejecting a limited view of “part of” enemy forces and accepting
substantial support to satisfy the 2012 NDAA authority for detention).
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court had acted improperly, the Circuit court argued, by taking it upon itself to
provide or examine the justification. The D.C. Circuit not only stressed the
authority of the executive branch in war, but bolstered executive power by drawing
in the authority of the legislature to set the terms of conflict.116 The D.C. Circuit
opinion in Al-Bihani stated that part of the legislative power to make law for the
United State meant that “Congress had the power to authorize the President in the
AUMF and other later statutes to exceed [the] bounds [of customary international
law of armed conflict].”117 While Congress had not done this in any clear or explicit
language, the court interpreted the possibility of legislative action to mean the
inappropriateness of judicial review. 118 “Therefore, while the international laws of
war are helpful to courts when identifying the general set of war powers to which
the AUMF speaks . . . their lack of controlling legal force and firm definition render
their use both inapposite and inadvisable when courts seek to determine the limits
of the President’s war powers.”119 The D.C. Circuit helped itself to the permissions
of international law while forgoing its prescriptions. 120
With no body of law to define the substantive scope of the preventative
detention powers of the President, the courts have chosen to defer. The D.C. Circuit
court did not work to adapt the existing rules of war, which would have developed
the legal standard with the aim of safeguarding the liberty interests of those at risk
of being subject to this power. The court also did not adopt an ad-hoc standard that
would permit judicial scrutiny on a case-by-case basis. Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit
accepted a flexible definition of membership (with the flexibility of judgment
permitted to the executive, not the judiciary), which in effect widened executive
discretion.121 If an individual can be said to be a “part of” or to have provided
substantial support to Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces, then they are
detainable until the end of the conflict pursuant to the President’s war powers. 122
To ascertain membership, courts do not require formal proof of membership or
evidence of service within the organization’s command structure. What amounts to
substantial support has no clear definition. 123 The standard is flexible, and the

See Salahi, 625 F.3d at 751 (“[T]he district court’s use of the ‘command structure’ test—a
standard that district judges in this circuit, operating without any meaningful guidance from
Congress, developed to determine whether a Guantanamo habeas petitioner was ‘part of’ alQaida.”).
117
Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 871.
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See id. at 878 (“[P]lacing a lower burden on the government defending a wartime detention—
where national security interests are at their zenith and the rights of the alien petitioner at their
nadir—is also permissible.”).
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Id. at 871.
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In Al Hela, the D.C. Circuit court failed to even mention or grapple with the question of the limits
imposed by international humanitarian law on Congressional authorization to detain. See generally
972 F.3d 120.
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See Salahi, 625 F.3d at 752; Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872.
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Al-Bihani, 590 F. 3d at 874 (“The determination of when hostilities have ceased is a political
decision, and we defer to the Executive’s opinion on the matter.”).
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See Al Hela, 972 F.3d at 132 (“[A] person may be found to substantially support enemy forces
without directly supporting them.”).
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executive decides.124 In fact, in a recent decision, the D.C. Circuit held
“[i]nvolvement in hostilities has never been a prerequisite for detention under the
AUMF”.125
Rhetorically, the separation of powers, as upheld by the Suspension Clause,
is lauded as the constitutional principle that is the true guardian of liberty, or the
main check against tyranny. 126 However, in practice the emphasis on institutional
powers has led the judiciary to sever the normative value of liberty from the
institutional one.127 The institutional arguments permitted the Supreme Court to
avoid deciding the difficult questions of what rights and protections of liberty the
accused enemy combatant ought to enjoy by virtue of the values contained in the
writ and Bill of Rights. Ultimately, that avoidance led the D.C. Circuit, in the words
of David Dyzenhaus, to forget “the fundamental values [of constitutionalism]
which [judicial review] is supposed to serve.” 128
The Supreme Court has not taken up the question of what substantive law
or what standards of review apply in reviewing Combatant Status Review Tribunals
(CSRT) findings since Boumediene.129 The Guantanamo detainees filed certiorari
petitions, challenging almost every aspect of the D.C. Circuit’s jurisprudence. For
example, in Al-Bihani v. Obama, the detainees’ certiorari petition raised the
question “whether the laws of armed conflict apply to determine the scope of who
may be indefinitely detained under the [AUMF].” 130 The Supreme Court denied
For example, the D.C. Circuit adopted the executive’s own definition of what amounts to
detainable conduct. See Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 721 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[A]n individual
who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who has
committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy forces.”);
Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority Relative to
Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 2, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, No. 08-0442
(D.D.C Mar. 13, 2009) https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/documents/memo-re-det-auth.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4ZVX-6Y4F](“[T]o detain any persons who were part of, or substantially
supported, Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the
United States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act, or
has directly supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy forces.”). The D.C. Circuit then proceeded
to relax significant procedural/evidentiary requirements, making the government’s task of meeting
the case easier. See, e.g., Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 879 (“[T]he question … when presented with
hearsay is not whether it is admissible—it is always admissible—but what probative weight to
ascribe to whatever indicia of reliability it exhibits.”); Latif v Obama, 666 F.3d 746, 747 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (adopting the ‘Mosaic Theory’ of evidence and a ‘presumption of regularity’ for the
government’s documentary evidence).
125
Al Hela, 972 F.3d at 132.
126
See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 745.
127
See Stephen Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit After Boumediene, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1451, 1466–
68 (2011) (explaining the difference in philosophy between the D.C. District and D.C. Circuit
courts).
128
Dyzenhaus, supra note 6, at 86.
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See Al Hela, 972 F.3d at 143 (“The Supreme Court has not revisited the extraterritorial
application of the Due Process Clause.”).
130
Brief for Petitioner at i, Al-Bihani v. Obama, 563 U.S. 929 (2011) (No. 10-7814)
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/GTMO-10-1383-Al-Bihani-petapp.pdf [https://perma.cc/34VR-5NAT].
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certiorari in this and many other cases, in effect making the D.C. Circuit the final
court for all Guantanamo habeas litigation. 131 On August 28, 2020, the D.C. Circuit,
following over a decade of silence from the Supreme Court, issued a decision
denying detainees at Guantanamo any substantive rights, holding “the Due Process
Clause [substantive or procedural] may not be invoked by aliens without property
or presence in the sovereign territory of the United States.” 132 The D.C. Circuit has
deferred to the executive on assessments of membership, divorced from elements
of dangerousness, international law of armed conflict, or national and territorial
links to the battlefield.
C. Judicial Disengagement and an Absent Legislature
The lack of substantive engagement or activity by the courts has been
accompanied by legislative disengagement. Where judicial review has produced no
tangible or principled limits on executive power, Congress has done nothing to
develop the law. While judicial activity cannot alone account for legislative
inaction, judicial pronouncements on constitutional rights and values matter in a
constitutional order.133 Acting against, or ignoring, a forceful and frank statement
on legality or constitutionality is much more difficult than avoiding stepping into a
fraught area of law. This section begins by considering the arguments for judicial
disengagement and political checks and then considers what principled judicial
reasoning could mean for legislative engagement.
131

See Brief for Petitioner at i, Al-Madhwani v. Obama, 567 U.S. 907 (2012) (No. 11-7020)
(“Whether the Court of Appeals’ expansive detention standard, approving detention based on
peripheral association with others now suspected of being associated with al Qaeda or on mere
presence at a guesthouse or training camp, is inconsistent with this Court’s rulings on the permissible
scope of executive detention under the [AUMF]. Whether the Court of Appeals’ denial of due
process protections to Guantanamo Bay detainees is inconsistent with the law and this Court’s
decision in Boumediene v. Bush.”); Brief for Petitioner at i, Almerfedi v. Obama, 567 U.S. 905
(2012) (No. 11-683) (“Whether the [AUMF] or Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), permits
detention on the basis of three facts that are themselves not incriminating.”); Brief for Petitioner at
i, Latif v Obama, 567 U.S. 913 (2012) (“[w]hether the court of appeals’ manifest unwillingness to
allow Guantanamo detainees to prevail in their habeas corpus cases calls for the exercise of this
Court’s supervisory power.”) Brief for Petitioner at i, Uthman v. Obama, 567 U.S. 905 (2012) (No.
11-413) (“Whether the [AUMF] authorizes the President to detain, indefinitely and possibly for the
rest of his life, an individual who was not shown to have fought for al Qaeda, trained to fight for al
Qaeda, or received or executed orders from al Qaeda, and was not claimed to have provided material
support to al Qaeda.”); see also Lyle Denniston, Court Bypasses All New Detainee Cases,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 11, 2012), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/court-bypasses-all-newdetainee-cases/ [https://perma.cc/2LFA-89DD] (“[T]he Supreme Court confirmed emphatically on
Monday that it is not now inclined to further second-guess the government’s detention policy.
Without one noted dissent, the Court turned down seven separate appeals by Guantanamo Bay
prisoners.”).
132
Al Hela, 972 F.3d at 143 (“The Supreme Court has not revisited the extraterritorial application
of the Due Process Clause. Accordingly, we have taken the Supreme Court at its word that
Boumediene concerned only the availability of the writ of habeas corpus.”).
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Legislative shortcoming when it comes to setting concrete limits on authorizations for the use of
military powers is nothing new. See e.g., John Hart Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part I:
The (Troubled) Constitutionality of the War They Told U.S. About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 877, 878
(1989).
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Much of the D.C. Circuit’s language and reasoning takes an all or nothing
view on institutional powers. Either the Bill of Rights protects these detainees,
putting their rights within judicial power and competence, or this domain belongs
to the executive, and the courts are ill-equipped to second guess the executive’s
assessment of what is necessary. In the United States, too often the emphasis is on
the institutional shortcomings of the judiciary and the dangers of a judicially run
war.134 However, complete deference or judicial supremacy are not the only two
options.135 Multiple institutional, constitutional, and substantive aims can be
accommodated, each to varying degrees, subject to principled reasoning. 136 The
U.S. Supreme Court is well aware of this reality and often deploys in its separationof-powers cases.137
The argument that the judicial branch, as an institution, is not well-suited
for checking executive power is persistent. 138 Part of the reason is an awareness that
the kinds of decisions involved in determining who should be detained in war or to
prevent future acts of terrorism in this AUMF-authorized conflict are not the same
kinds of decisions that courts make. 139 Without a clear definition of who is part of
the conflict and poses the kind of danger that justifies detention, the courts have to
muddle through prediction, organizational arrangements and meaning, and limited
evidence. Political processes are better suited, so the reasoning continues, to put
limits on executive power and to check the executive when or if it goes too far. 140
However, this argument fails to notice the interdependence of institutional roles for
a proper exercise of the separation of powers doctrine. Court pronouncements about
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See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (“Since we conclude that the legitimate
needs of the judicial process may outweigh Presidential privilege, it is necessary to resolve those
competing interests in a manner that preserves the essential functions of each branch.”); Dames &
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what constitutional principles require or prohibit are highly relevant and
consequential for guiding legislative exercise of power.141
Importantly, the courts discharge the judicial function by directly
confronting the constitutional stakes. A common criticism calls attention to the
courts’ repeated failure to check executive decision-making in the war and national
security context, counseling instead a greater reliance on the political process. 142
This argument often overlooks how and why courts have failed in the past, and
underestimates the impact principled judicial scrutiny can have on the political
process. As Jeremy Waldron points out, in the United States:
[T]he courts have proved reluctant to oppose reductions in civil liberties in
times of war or war-like emergency. This makes it something of a mystery why
legal scholars continue to defend the counter-majoritarian powers of the judiciary
on the ground that such a power will prevent panic-stricken attacks on basic rights
by popular majorities.143
According to this line of thought, the courts are not likely to step up and
challenge executive power. This judicial failure raises concerns over the potential
compromise of judicial authority, a concern that Justice Jackson memorably voiced
in the infamous case of Korematsu—a case upholding the constitutionality of an
executive order that placed Japanese Americans into internment camps. Justice
Jackson dissented, with a plea to avoid judicial involvement. He argued that courts
were not good at making these decisions and if they were to try, the law itself would
be corrupted. “But a judicial construction of the due process clause that will sustain
this order,” he warned, “is a far more subtle blow to liberty than the promulgation
of the order itself.”144 These concerns over the corruption of law or the
ineffectiveness of law assume both that judicial acquiescence, meekness, is the only
outcome and that political means of checking executive power are more effective
because they are independent of judicial decision-making.145 Given the reality of
congressional inaction in this area of the law,146 especially in the post-9/11
detention context, there is real reason to doubt the assumptions these criticisms are
141

See J. MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS: THE IMPACT OF
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See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT (2014); GERALD
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Jeremy Waldron, Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance, 11(2) J. POL. PHIL. 191, 191
(2003).
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See generally CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITY 3–18 (COLON CAMPBELL
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rooted in and to consider what principled judicial action could do for congressional
engagement.
There were several dissenting opinions in Korematsu. Justice Jackson’s
dissent, cited above, made central the danger to the judiciary and the Constitution
if the courts compromised the strength and quality of rights review, in order to
accommodate the demands of security in a time of war. Justice Murphy’s dissent
on the other hand took issue with how the majority had deployed the strict scrutiny
standard, especially given the fundamental rights at stake. 147 The solution, he
stressed, is to focus even more carefully on fundamental rights, not to avoid them
altogether.148 Murphy wrote, “[L]ike other claims conflicting with the asserted
constitutional rights of the individual, the military claim must subject itself to the
judicial process of having its reasonableness determined and its conflict with other
interests reconciled.”149 The solution, according to Justice Murphy’s reasoning, is
not to give up on judicial review but to put greater emphasis on the unique judicial
mandate to enforce individual rights and to provide principled reasoning. Some
decades later, when a congressionally established commission of senior leaders
from each branch of the U.S. government reviewed the executive order and
internment practices, they concluded that the forces driving those policies “were
race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership.”150 It is hard not to
wonder what would have occurred had the judiciary demanded a better
demonstration of necessity rather than deferred to the highly general, and obviously
flawed, claims of the executive.
In post-9/11 cases, the courts have not learned their lesson. Courts have not
rethought their institutional role, especially in relation to the legislature as a partner
rather than an overlord in checking executive discretion. The D.C. Circuit has failed
to articulate the substantive constitutional principle driving judicial review. In fact,
by focusing on institutional power principles divorced from substantive values, the
courts in the United States have contributed to legislative disengagement. The D.C.
Circuit has engaged in a systemic process of removing all substantive principles
tied to the exercise of judicial review. 151 If there is no problem, there is no need for
a solution. As the following sections will outline, the courts in the United Kingdom
147
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have provided more substantive review, thereby prompting Parliament to develop
a legislative response to the threat from terrorism. U.K. courts have clarified what
constitutional and European Convention on Human Rights (“Convention”) rights
the detainees or controlees enjoy, and the scope of those rights in a national security
context. U.K. courts have identified procedural and evidentiary flaws. The U.K.
Parliament, in turn, has addressed these flaws in each legislative iteration.
The U.S. Congress has done nothing to check executive preventive
detention power. It has passed no new authorization amending the vagueness of the
AUMF. In fact, Congress has incorporated executive standards into legislative text.
Section 1021(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 (NDAA)
incorporated the flexible framework already used by the executive. 152 The NDAA
even went as far as to make clear that Congress does not seek to limit the President’s
authority: “Nothing in this section is intended to limit or expand the authority of
the President or the scope of the Authorization for Use of Military Force.” 153 It is
worth wondering what would have happened had the courts made some changes to
the definition of detainable person/conduct the executive used, i.e., requiring that
detention be necessary to prevent future risk, and then exercised judicial scrutiny
to ensure rigorous enforcement of legal standards, by carefully examining the
standards of proof and rules of evidence. 154 Would Congress have been compelled
to incorporate such a standard, however half-heartedly, into a revised statutory
framework?155 Or would Congress have pushed back, offering an alternative
standard of its own, thereby providing some substantive parameters for the courts
to evaluate and enforce? For the prosecution of “alien unprivileged enemy
belligerents,” there was some constitutionally valuable legislative engagement.
When the courts found faults in the system set up by the executive for the
prosecutions of belligerents in the “War on Terror,”156 Congress enacted a statute
that provided the scope of the commissions jurisdictions and procedures to be
used.157 Even though the MCA 2006 did not take away the military prosecution
authority of the executive, it established legal standards that could be evaluated for
compliance with the Constitution, as well as standards by which the legality of
executive action could be measured. 158 For facilitating institutional engagement,
some standards are better than undefined and undifferentiated discretion.
Any broad claims about causes and effects of institutional action or
collaboration confront significant challenges. There are many factors that influence
the political processes, including reasons beyond the law and the legal subject
152
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matter that dictate legislative action or inaction. When considering the institutional
roles of the courts and legislatures, we should be aware of how one branch’s
exercise, or misuse, of power can shape another branch’s actions. Judicial reasoning
can guide and direct the development of a statutory framework, ensuring that
constitutional principles of liberty and the separation of powers inform the relevant
text.159 Judicial articulations of limits and standards rooted in fundamental
principles can spur legislative engagement and guide statutory developments while
alleviating the institutional tensions between the executive and the courts.
D. U.K. Courts as Cautious and Imperfect Guardians of Convention Rights
While U.S. courts refused to issue any substantive holdings, U.K. courts
engaged in constitutional analysis and decision-making, identifying violations and
flaws for the legislature to remedy. The next two sections identify the legal
landscape in the United Kingdom following 9/11 and the judicial and legislative
engagement with issues surrounding executive powers. The article then categorizes
judicial engagement and identifies the kinds of limits the courts established. As that
Part will show, the U.K. courts did not narrow the definition of detainable or
controllable conduct but instead focused on articulating the reach and scope of the
Convention rights at stake and identifying ways in which the existing legislative
framework could or should be amended to cure those constitutional ills.
The initial post-9/11 detention power used in the United Kingdom, granted
through the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001 (ATCSA), explicitly
authorized the detention of suspected international terrorists.160 Referring back to
the definition of terrorism provided in the Terrorism Act of 2000, the ATCSA
granted new powers of indefinite detention to the Secretary of State. 161 Section 23
explicitly authorized the detention of suspected international terrorists whose
removal or departure from the United Kingdom was prevented by law or practical
impediments.162 The Terrorism Act of 2000 defines terrorism as an act that:
involves serious violence against a person, . . . involves serious damage to
property, . . . endangers a person’s life, . . . creates a serious risk to the health or
safety of the public or a section of the public, or . . . is designed seriously to interfere
with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system. 163
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The Act goes on to clarify that these actions include “action[s] outside the
United Kingdom, [and apply to] any person, or to property, wherever situated, [and
includes the public or the government] of the United Kingdom, of a Part of the
United Kingdom, or of a country other than the United Kingdom.” 164 As is evident
from the text, given the broad definition, a great deal is left open to executive
judgment, in terms of how the power is to be exercised, and provides no real
definition of what conduct makes someone subject to the executive’s powers.
The events of 9/11, and all that followed, coincided with a key moment in
the constitutional history of the United Kingdom. The constitutional moment
played a key role in how differently the U.K. courts understood their institutional
responsibility when they come to review executive conduct. 165 In 1998, the U.K.
Parliament enacted the Human Rights Act (HRA) which came into effect on
October 2, 2000.166 When Parliament enacted the HRA, the rights enshrined in the
European Convention of Human Rights fell for the first time unambiguously within
the purview of the British judiciary. 167 U.K. judges were given the power to review
Parliamentary legislation for compliance with the Convention and to either interpret
the text to make it compatible, section 3, or if that was not possible, to issue a
declaration of incompatibility, section 4.168 The incorporation of the Convention
has significantly transformed the courts’ powers. With the courts empowered to
enforce the Convention, the national security doctrine of non-justiciability, which
governed all national security matters before the enactment of the HRA, gave way
to judicial scrutiny.169 The HRA did not upend fundamental institutional principles.
The courts developed new doctrinal tools to accommodate existing institutional
competency considerations in national security: the doctrines of deference. 170 As
164
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Mark Elliott notes, doctrines of deference maintain institutional distinctions by
safeguarding substantive rights; it makes “the tests which comprise the
proportionality doctrine less hard-edged, blunting them such that the
[government’s] decision may pass muster without precisely mirroring the court’s
view.”171 This blunting leaves some room for differences in institutional
competence to shape how substantive rights are protected.
These changes raised new questions of exactly how the institutional
dynamics rooted in principles of the U.K. Constitution—supremacy of Parliament
and executive prerogatives in war and national security—would accommodate the
demands of the HRA. As a result, when Parliament enacted the ATCSA, the
judiciary’s role had been significantly strengthened by the incorporation of
Convention rights into domestic law and when a great deal remained open, legally,
in terms of institutional dynamics.
After the passage of the ATCSA, the government’s first move was to turn
to an escape clause in order to maintain a maximum amount of discretion in the
hands of the executive. Given the potentially wide sweeping reach of Convention
rights, there is an emergency get out-clause that permits states to jettison some of
the limitations imposed. Article 15(1) of the European Convention for Human
Rights reads, “In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the
nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its
obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies
of the situation.”172 Stating the need to derogate from the article 5, right to liberty,
in order to confront the serious threat posed by Al-Qaeda, the government issued
the Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order 2001.173
Tom Hickman, writing about post-9/11 jurisprudence, summarized the
rationale behind derogation as follows: the need to derogate is born out of a belief
that any legal limits on emergency powers are “futile and counterproductive.”174 It
is:
never possible to expunge the need and scope for uncontrolled executive
action within a legal constitutional system; and the argument that seeking to do so
is counterproductive asserts that accommodating exceptional measures within a
review is entitled to substitute its own decision for that of the constitutional decision-maker.”). For
a fuller understanding of the standards of review prior to the Human Rights Act and how the
doctrines have evolved, see generally, Lord Irvine, Judges and Decision Makers: The Theory and
Practice of Wednesbury Review, PUB. L. 59 (1996); Michael Taggart, Proportionality, Deference,
Wednesbury, N.Z. L. REV. 423 (2008); Alison L. Young, Will You, Won’t You, Will You Join the
Deference Dance?, 34 OX. J. LEGAL STUD. 375 (2014).
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normative frame hampers the exercise of executive power when it is most important
not to do so.175
What the doctrine of non-justiciability accomplished in the common law—
providing a space for executive prerogative to respond to the demands of necessity
with a free hand—is achieved through article 15(1) of the Convention.176 It allows
for derogation in times of “war or public emergency,” and for the government to
decide when such a measure is necessary.177 But as the suspension of human rights
is undertaken through legal means, it is subject to judicial supervision. The
suspension of the rights regime requires judicial review to ensure the decision to
suspend is legally justified. “Understood in this way,” writes Hickman, “derogation
creates a double-layered constitutional system: both layers exist within a regime of
legality, but only one exists within the human rights regime.” 178 But this double
layer leaves the question of the proper level of judicial scrutiny of derogation open.
Should it resemble the kind of review conducted by the courts in the pre-HRA cases
where the doctrine of non-justiciability governed?179 Should the courts defer to the
judgement of the executive about the need to derogate and the scope of the
derogation? If not, then how should the judiciary review the decision to derogate?
The Law Lords’ decision in Belmarsh answered these questions.
The case of A v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Belmarsh) was
the most significant U.K. case to tackle the question of government’s emergency
powers post-9/11.180 The case arose from the detention of nine non-nationals who
were being indefinitely detained at the Belmarsh prison because they were
designated a risk to national security but could not be deported. 181 Lord Bingham’s
opinion in Belmarsh, while significantly deferring to the government’s judgment
on whether a state of emergency existed, reasserted the courts’ role of review in
assessing whether the measures employed to confront the threat were necessary for
the task at hand. Lord Bingham accepted that the judgment involved in determining
whether a state of emergency truly exists is “a pre-eminently political” one.182 The
decision involved an assessment best suited for the executive branch. 183 But the
175
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nature of that derogation, Lord Bingham reasoned, was a different matter. The
Court held the derogation was disproportionate because it relied on a distinction
between foreigners and citizens that bore no significant relationship to the threat.184
Given the consequences for the people subject to these powers, the Court asked
itself whether derogation on these terms was strictly required. The answer was no.
The exercise of the judicial power and the level of scrutiny was explained and
defended by the substantive rights and interests at stake:
Where the rights of the individual are in issue, the nature of the emergency
must first be identified, and then compared with the effects on the individual of
depriving him of those rights. In my opinion it is the proper function of the judiciary
to subject the government’s reasoning on these matters in this case to very close
analysis.185
Here, the court relied on article 14, discrimination, to give structure and
shape to the necessity prong of the proportionality test and to exercise heightened
scrutiny.186 Unlike the courts in the U.S., the U.K. court explicitly identified the
individual rights at stake and grappled with how the existing authority infringed on
those rights.
When the House of Lords made a declaration of incompatibility, Parliament
had the option of redrafting the authorization, expanding the power to include
British citizens suspected of terrorism. 187 Instead, Parliament passed the Prevention
of Terrorism Act 2005 (PTA), repealing the detention provisions in the 2001 Act,
and granted government the authority to use control orders in order to deal with the
individuals who had been detained and were still considered a threat. 188 A control
order could be issued against both citizens and aliens with no distinction. In
authorizing the discretionary powers of the executive, Parliament designed the
control order scheme with the Convention in mind. This Parliamentary decision
was made both out of moral and political pressure to fulfill the United Kingdom’s
international obligation and as a way of preempting or complying with decisions of
U.K. courts and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.189 Consider
the language of the PTA outlining how the Secretary of State should make her
decision to impose a control order: she may do so when she “considers that it is
necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a
risk of terrorism to make a control order imposing obligations on that individual.”190
This language echoes language of proportionality.
See id. at [33] (“Yet the threat from UK nationals, if quantitatively smaller, is not said to be
qualitatively different from that from foreign nationals.”).
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Under section 3(2)(a) of the Act, the Secretary of State could apply to the
court for permission to make a non-derogating order, which the court could grant
or quash after considering “whether the Secretary of State’s decision that there are
grounds to make that order is obviously flawed.”191 This “obviously flawed
standard,” with its permissive language, seems to require a rather light touch
review, leaving the executive decision undisturbed unless it betrays an
unreasonable exercise of power. While control measures do not usually deprive an
individual of their liberty, they do still violate other qualified rights, such as the
article 8 interest in liberty and private life.192 Even if these rights are qualified, the
aspects of human life and dignity they seek to protect are significant. The very real
and profound impact on the lives they control can be deep and disturbing.193 If the
importance of liberty to the ordering of a just society justifies judicial guardianship
and vigilance, its classification as a qualified right would presumably not render the
level of judicial scrutiny unrecognizably diminished.194 If the obviously flawed
standard is an attempt to diminish judicial review, then the courts’ unwillingness to
surrender review is a significant defense of both the values the Convention seeks to
protect and of a system committed to institutional checks. An Administrative Court
decision, in one of the most important control measure cases, made just that
observation when it considered the consequences of a literal interpretation of the
statutory language. If the “obviously flawed” standard is applied as the language
reads, then the “controlees’ rights under the Convention are being determined not
by an independent court in compliance with article 6, but by executive decisionmaking, untrammeled by any prospect of effective judicial supervisions.” 195
Finding such a level of deference insufficient to protect individual rights, the court
pushed back. It interpreted the standard to require searching judicial scrutiny
enough to provide independent review.196
After much public debate and judicial prodding, the next legislative change
came when Parliament revised and replaced the control order regime with the
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (TPIM). 197 Under the
Id. at § 3(2)(a); see also § 3(10) (“In pursuance of directions under subsection (2)(c) or (6)(b) or
(c), the function of the court is to determine whether any of the following decisions of the Secretary
of State was flawed.”).
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TPIM statute, the standard set for the Secretary of State was raised to “reasonable
belief” rather than “reasonable suspicion.” 198 The TPIM statute was amended again
by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act of 2015, most notably raising the
standard from “reasonable belief” to “balance of probabilities.” 199 The measures
themselves were altered; outright bans on internet and phone use were curtailed, as
were some of the more extreme restrictions on association. 200
E. Institutional Interaction/Influence: Judicial Review and Parliamentary
Engagement
When comparing the strength and effectiveness of separation of powers
principles between the U.S. and U.K. constitutions, it is somewhat surprising to
discover that the U.K. courts have made a more robust and effective use of
institutional principles. 201 In the cases we are concerned with, greater judicial
scrutiny has prompted legislative action. Jurisprudence that articulates judicial
competence with substantive principles, specifically human rights, has provided a
more consistent and principled case law, one that is capable of guiding legislative
engagement by identifying the constitutional principles at stake. As the U.K. courts
worked to articulate the limits imposed by human rights on executive powers of
detention and control, their pronouncements informed the legislative text. 202 As a
result, the legislature has developed the legal framework to better comply with
constitutional law by, for example, changing burdens of proof or reconsidering the
proportionality of excessive curfews or relocation orders. The changes to statutory
grants of power alleviate some of the constitutional tensions that result from broad
discretionary powers of the executive and searching scrutiny of the exercises of that
power by the judiciary.203
The judicial role of supervising the space between Parliamentary
enactments and the executive’s powers is quintessentially about separating the
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different functions of governance with the aim of checking improper, selfinterested, or careless exercises of state power. 204 This arrangement requires
Parliament to set down general rules while creating a space for judicial oversight
of both legislative enactment and executive action. As Jeremy Waldron put it,
“separation of powers is . . . a matter of articulated governance (as contrasted with
compressed undifferentiated exercises of power).”205 The constitutional challenge
arises because of how much is left open in the space between legislative enactment
and executive action. Prompting greater legislative involvement in shaping and
limiting that open space helps lessen the constitutional tensions.
If we want legislatures to take better account of these constitutional
principles in drafting any future authorizations, then there is value in having the
courts taking action. Courts should try to provide legal tools for establishing
reasoned and articulated limits on discretion, or at the very least say when the
existing framework or a particular exercise of power has violated constitutional
limits. The control order cases do present an example of how “enforcement of
Convention rights …under the HRA [can be a] collaborative enterprise between all
three branches.”206 In these cases overlap of institutional competencies does not
lead to complete conflation of institutional roles. The HRA has truly changed the
institutional relationship among the branches, especially in national security: “the
courts are [no longer] just servants of Parliament’s will—they are also partners in
a constitutional collaboration, who are charged with the (often creative) task of
furthering, determining, applying and sometimes modifying that will in order to
achieve a Convention-compatible result.”207 By exercising the judicial power to
decide what constitutional principles and fundamental rights demand, the court
makes it harder for Parliament to forget or undervalue individual rights when
drafting primary legislation.
Section 3 of the HRA provides a means of justifying and expanding the
interpretive methods open to the courts when encountering statutory language that
fails to provide clear guidance or which fails to adequately protect Convention
rights.208 Rather than automatically finding such language a reason for deference,
the courts incorporate the normative weight of Convention rights to shape that
discretion, at times through case-specific balancing of interests. 209
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The legal limits, first defended by the courts, have found their way into
legislative text throughout the evolution of the legal framework, with Parliament
actively engaging with the courts’ reasoning. It was the court’s declaration of
incompatibility in Belmarsh that led to Parliament abandoning detention powers,
authorized by the ATCSA, and turning to the less severe control measures,
authorized by PTA and TPIM.210 Since then, as courts identified aspects of the
practice that raise problems, e.g., 18-hour curfew, low burden of proof, relocation
orders,211 Parliament incorporated those determinations when drafting the next
statute, shaping the legal framework to ensure better compliance with Convention
rights.
In Secretary of State for the Home Department v. JJ, the House of Lords
considered whether a particularly severe control order, with an 18-hour curfew,
violated a controlee’s article 5 right to liberty, and which Secretary of State did not
have the power to derogate, or whether the formal difference between placing an
individual in prison and imposing control measures outside of prison meant that it
was instead the article 8 interest in liberty that was engaged.212 Carrying the
majority of the court, Lord Bingham’s analysis weighed the circumstances on the
ground to determine whether the imposed measures had deprived six individuals of
liberty, regardless of whether their situation fitted into the classic definition of
imprisonment.213 The case involved six Iraqi and Iranian nationals who had been
placed under particularly stringent control orders by the Secretary of State pursuant
to powers conferred by section 1(2)(a) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. 214
Each person was confined to a one-bedroom residence for 18-hours; they were also
electronically tagged and monitored, with police permitted to enter and search their
premises at any time.215 Visitors were not permitted to come without prior Home
Office permission, and controlees were not permitted to meet anyone outside of
their residence without Home Office permission.216
The majority held that the level of restraint constituted a loss of liberty. In
interpreting the scope of article 5, Lord Bingham reasoned that the Convention
called on judges to evaluate the circumstances of the case in determining whether
a deprivation had occurred in practice. 217 It became “the task of a court . . . to assess
the impact of the measures in question on a person in the situation of the person
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subject to them.”218 Even if detention in a prison is a paradigmatic example of a
deprivation of liberty, “account should be taken of a whole range of factors such as
the nature, duration, effects and manner of execution or implementation of the
penalty or measure in question.”219 The next time Parliament came to legislate
control measures, it placed stricter limits on the use of curfews.
The TPIM reduced the amount of time a controlee could be made to stay in
their home by setting an overnight residency requirement of 10 hours.220 David
Anderson, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, described these
changes as “an appreciable (and welcome) liberalization of the regime.” 221
Lawmakers responding to the legal reality have created a statutory framework that
better complies with Convention rights. By relying on principled, flexible, and
contextual interpretation, the courts have avoided making decisions that would
upend or undo the legislative framework altogether. Instead, courts have pushed the
legislative framework to be more aware of and responsive to the demands of human
rights. For example, instead of finding the “reasonable suspicion” standard and the
language of “obviously flawed” in the PTA incompatible with article 8 and article
6, the courts read into the statute a requirement that courts exercise “intense
scrutiny.”222 When Parliament drafted the TPIM Bill, it first raised the standard to
“reasonable belief” and then to “balance of probabilities.” 223 The determination by
the court that a higher standard was legally required given the rights at stake came
to be reflected in statutory language.224
Parliament has amended statutory powers, limiting executive discretion.
The limits have focused on the exact powers granted to the executive and
procedural requirements for exercising those powers, rather than on clearer
definitions or limitations of detainable conduct. The changes help the legislative
text to better reflect both institutional and rule of law principles. Legislative support
for raising burdens of proof and standards of scrutiny also lessened some of the
concerns particular to the U.K. context that resulted from overlapping competencies
of the courts and the executive in the exercise of proportionality review of executive
decision-making. Where the courts set clear rules for what violates or raises
especially strong concerns about Convention rights, e.g., long curfews, Parliament
took those judicial conclusions about rights into account in drafting statutory text.
Where the legal matter was not directly about defining a right or an interest but
about institutional mechanisms for enforcing those interests, as in the case of
burdens of proof and level of scrutiny, the court exercised more demanding
218
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scrutiny. This impacted the political debate over what was feasible and ultimately
garnered legislative support for raising the standard of scrutiny.
Before concluding this section, it is worth noting that in these control
measure cases there are nuances to how the courts approach review, and a
responsiveness to practical realities of judicial and legislative activity. For example,
one of the powers provided for in the PTA 2005 was the power to impose a
relocation order to make the suspected individual move away from the city or town
where the officials suspect he or she has concerning contacts. 225 When the courts
came to review the cases involving relocation orders, they did not find the practice
incompatible or unjustified writ large but did note how onerous the requirement
was on the individual, that it amounted to a severe interference, and that it would
require strong justification to be upheld in individual cases.226 In the TPIM Act of
2011, Parliament removed the power from the list of measures authorized. The
power was added back into the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act of 2015
because, the Government argued, the rise in numbers of U.K. nationals going to
Iraq and Syria to fight for ISIS, and then returning to the United Kingdom, raised
the threat level and the current measures—such as check-ins, and surveillance of
individuals under control measures—put serious strains on resources.227
Even as the definition of terrorism remained broad and imprecise, the
legislative framework evolved. Judicial decisions prompted legislative action while
leaving the legislature relatively free to select different options to develop the
statutory framework, incorporate judicial judgments, or provide additional
rationales to push back against judicial assessment of the balance of interests.
As this section has shown, in the United Kingdom, where judicial review
has been more substantive and rigorous, and informed by a substantive
understanding of the individual rights involved, the legislature has engaged with
developing limits on executive discretion. Judicial decisions and principles have
engaged Parliament and the executive in the process of establishing parameters for
the exercise of these national security powers. By deciding substantive questions,
the courts have provided both guidance and an impetus for amending primary
legislation. Judicial scrutiny prompted Parliamentary action and shaped the
statutory changes we have seen develop from the ATCSA to the Counter-Terrorism
and Security Act 2015.By contrast, the lack of substantive engagement or activity
by the courts in the United States has been accompanied by legislative
disengagement. After the enactment of the AUMF in 2001, Congress has largely
225
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remained silent, allowing the executive to run the show.228 The examination of
judicial and legislative action in these two jurisdictions shows how judicial activity
opens the door for constitutionally valuable legislative activity.
The lack of judicial pronouncement on constitutional principles makes it, at
the very least, easier for the legislature to stay out of this constitutionally fraught
area.229 Unsurprisingly then, without judicial holdings on legal standards or
shortcomings of the existing framework, Congress has not had to confront the
constitutional problems resulting from the broad power it granted to the executive.
There is a persistent and profound difficulty with counterterrorism law of
providing clear definitions within legislative grants of authority. This difficulty
frustrates traditional means of both prospectively limiting discretion through clear
standards and providing courts with a statutory basis for checking executive power.
As this section shows, there is reason to believe that legislative involvement
becomes more robust when the courts provide rights-based reasoning and means of
limiting executive discretion. The U.K. courts’ willingness to take a stand and make
substantive decisions rooted in individual rights partially explains why Parliament
abandoned the use of detention, made changes to burdens of proof and to the arsenal
of available control measures, and imposed a two-year limit on the use of these
measures against any one individual. As it turns out, “[t]he language of rights
matters in politics, and we can expect people to be at a political disadvantage when
their opponents are able to say ‘Why do you want to take away the rights the courts
have told us we have?’”230 Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress has not been compelled
by substantive, fundamental rights decisions by the courts to re-think, re-word, or
re-consider the authority it granted to the executive in the AUMF. 231 More than
fifteen years down the line, and the United States has little development in the law
in this area, allowing imprecision in legal standards to reinforce broad executive
discretion. If legislative authorization plays a key role in the proper functioning of
separation of powers, then separation of powers in the U.S. is not functioning
properly in this context.
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III. Are All Engagements Created Equal? Pro-Constitutional Engagement

A look at the various cases and statutes examined in the previous section
shows that there are different kinds of judicial and legislative actions, possible and
at-play. Activity alone is not enough to declare a proper functioning of the
separation of powers. The analysis in Part II provides some ideas of what valuable
judicial and legislative engagement entails. Part of what we understand as the aim
of separation of powers is separating out the different steps of governance. 232 There
is value in having one branch say, with some clarity, what the law is or what powers
the executive has and where those powers end, then having another branch exercise
judgement in executing the law, and finally, having a third independent branch
ensure that the exercise of this power complies with both enacted law and the
relevant fundamental constitutional principles. In this context, that might mean the
legislature saying what kind of conduct or associxation must be shown to make
someone subject to the states’ power of detention, followed by an executive making
strategic choices informed by expert judgement and access to intelligence, and a
court reviewing the decision. Here, where wide discretion creates constitutional
problems, society wants more developed, clearly articulated, and constitutionally
sensitive legislation. This Part will examine the institutional interplay in the United
Kingdom to identify the categories of changes brought about through that interplay
and whether these kinds of changes are valuable in advancing constitutional values.
In other words, did judicial review lead to legislative refinement of the definition
of detainable and punishable conduct? If not, what kind of changes were made to
the legal framework authorizing executive powers and were those changes
constitutionally valuable?
There is a spectrum between grants of undefined authority and clearly
articulated or unambiguous standards. Part of what a well-functioning institutional
dynamic should promote is finding or pushing for the best possible point on that
spectrum.233 A hypothetical legislative enactment could merely provide a broad
grant of power, one that provides no real law to apply but merely complies with the
most basic requirement of legality. 234 Or a legislature could exercise its authority
to provide legal definitions and standards that shape and guide how this power of
232

See JEREMY WALDRON, POLITICAL POLITICAL THEORY 45–46 (2016) (discussing the articulated
governance aim of the separation of powers); see also Aziz Huq & Jon Michaels, The Cycles of
Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 126 YALE L.J. 346, 355–56 (2016).
233
See generally Rosalind Dixon, The Forms, Functions and Varieties of Weak(ened) Judicial
Review, 17 INT’L J CON. L. 904 (2019) (analyzing different forms of judicial review and interactions
with political processes that change the effectiveness of review); Allison Young, Is Dialogue
Working Under the Human Rights Act 1998?, PUB L. 773 (2011); Peter Hogg et al., Charter
Dialogue Revisited: Or Much Ado About Metaphors, 45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1 (2007) (analyzing
the dialogue theory of judicial review, or give and take between courts and legislatures, in Canadian
jurisprudence and scholarship).
234
See Tess, Bridgeman, How to Ensure New Congressional War Authorization Is Not a Blank
Check, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/55147/stop-congressionalwar-authorization-blank-check/ [https://perma.cc/ZCH2-6F3U]; Gene Healy & John Glaser,
Repeal, Don’t Replace the AUMF, CATO INSTITUTE (July/Aug. 2018), https://www.cato.org/policyreport/julyaugust-2018/repeal-dont-replace-aumf [https://perma.cc/82NL-EM6Y].

2021 / Pro-Constitutional Engagement

43

the state will be exercised. That sort of legal framework would, among other things,
comply with and consider what the constitution demands.235 A form of judicial
review could assert the authority to look over the constitutionality of the legal
authority, or the existence of legal authority, but does nothing more than
uncritically accept executive definitions of the law and presentations of evidence.
Another might attempt to articulate substantive legal rules or standards to guide the
executive’s exercise of power or reshape the scope of that power. At the very least,
the judicial review could say when the existing legal framework is not precise or
clear enough to satisfy legality. Each of these kinds of grants or reviews would
constitute institutional activity. However, in terms of separation of powers, they are
not equally valuable. This Section considers constitutionally valuable institutional
engagement. One of the main conclusions this Article will draw from the analysis
in these pages is that hollow judicial engagement engenders hollow, or even
harmful, legislative engagement.
A. Legislative Engagement as Distinct from Legislative Activity
How to measure the right kind of engagement? The public law challenge
presented by these national security detention and control powers is largely the
result of lack of definition. The challenges arises because the limit on the power to
detain is vague or what kind of action triggers and justifies the state’s authority to
take freedom away. 236 Under such circumstances, the risk of detaining someone
because of faulty evidence or lazy, fearful, or uninformed judgement is high. 237
Given this, the legislature should provide a better definition of what counts as
detainable conduct, or a better articulation of the framework to be used. An
effective framework would articulate the process to determine the appropriate
balance between the state’s interest in successful prosecution of the war or interest
in national defense and the individual’s interest in not being arbitrarily detained—
something clear enough to be understood, justified, and enforced.
The analysis of what courts in the United Kingdom were able to identify as
within the judicial authority raises some questions about whether better definitions
for detainable conduct is likely to come about as a result of judicial scrutiny.
Judicial scrutiny could create definition either through common law style definition
of what kinds of factors may or may not be meaningful or by prompting the
legislature to do more to provide a refined definition. While Parliament has
235
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developed the legal framework, it has not provided a more precise definition of
terrorism or terrorist related activity. 238 This may mean that a better definition is
not currently available. States—especially executive officials—may need to
acquire a better understanding of the nature of the threat from international
terrorism and the kinds of narratives, categories, and contexts that provide tailored
factors for identifying the appropriate targets for the state’s preventive control
powers. However, what this analysis does show, is that judicial engagement was
able to identify ways in which executive power itself could be limited without
limiting the definition of terrorism itself. Through the institutional interplay
between the courts and Parliament, the powers granted to the executive went from
power of indefinite detention to authority to impose, for one year only, a set of
orders limiting the freedom of movement and association of individuals suspected
of terrorism related activity. 239 Even though the latter power still raises significant
civil rights concerns, the authority is undeniably less severe than indefinite
detention.
B. Judicial Deference, Judicial Activism, and Judicial Review
This section begins by identifying possible avenues for valuable judicial
review by looking to the institutional ground that U.K. courts have been able to
stake out. Overlap between legal, expert, and policy judgements makes courts
hesitate, for fear of treading on executive or legislative ground. Thus, there is
challenge to identifying the kinds of decisions, or aspects of those decisions, that
are especially within judicial competence. Once courts are able to pull out and
identity the constitutional problems in the existing law or practice, the legislature
can know what needs to be changed to make their policy choices constitutionally
compliant.
Given the analysis in Part II, of judicial activity in these two jurisdictions,
what would be valuable judicial engagement? Institutional powers depend on or
respond to one another. Legislation drafted with precision, providing clear evidence
of justified policy, will be met with and deserve a different kind of judicial review
than legislation that provides no parameters for exercise of the state’s power of
violence.240 Once executive decisions are added, it becomes even more
complicated. If the executive had never used the AUMF to claim powers of
indefinite detention, the judiciary may not have had a chance to review this
legislative grant at all. Even if the judiciary had the opportunity, it would not have
been with the same stakes in the litigation. 241 Similarly, the scope of both judicial
power and legislative power is impacted by the kind of individual interests
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involved.242 In the indefinite preventive detention cases, the judiciary is particularly
engaged given its mandate to serve as the independent arbiter safeguarding
individuals’ freedom from arbitrary detention. 243 Given the judiciary’s heightened
claim of institutional authority, justified by the individual rights at stake, the scope
of legislative and executive policy choices are correspondingly impacted.
There are roughly three kinds of decisions the courts have teased out as
particularly within their competence. First, defining what legal rights are at stake,
i.e., line drawing on what amounts to a deprivation of liberty. Second, determining
what fair trial guarantees require, i.e., limiting the use of closed evidence and
safeguarding the detainee’s right to know the evidence against them. Third, setting
standards of scrutiny and burdens of proof according to the relevant interests. By
focusing on the individual interests at stake, the courts have been compelled to
measure the standards of scrutiny and burdens of proof in relation to the liberty
interests at stake, and to push for more rights-compliant practices. The link between
judicial power and fundamental rights provides the judiciary with the reasons to
act, and thereby parameters for judicial action.
It is the highest court that is able to engage with the line drawing exercise,
and so presents the clearest example of judicial review justifiably asserting and
defining judicial authority. Once these parameters are set, however, it is the lower
courts that must review decisions. They do so in a context where it becomes more
difficult to clearly distinguish judicial judgement on legal standards from executive
judgement on risk and strategy. Lower courts in the United Kingdom are able to
conduct review at this level in large part because of the proportionality standard,
the dominant Convention standard. 244 For it is the proportionality standard that
allows for contextual and flexible judicial weighing of different interests. 245 That
same contextualism, however, does raise some concerns for judicial legitimacy. 246
Nevertheless, however imperfect the judicial action may be, it has advanced
the law and provided impetus for judicial action and legislative reform. If the
alternative is judicial abdication, of the kind found in the U.S., a little overlap or
blurring of the lines between institutional domains is preferable, especially if it
helps advance the law in an area where greater development of legal tools and
frameworks is needed to ensure constitutional exercise of power. Counterterrorism
operations are not likely to end any time soon, and the legal standards and
frameworks developed in detention and control cases are likely to, and in some
cases already do, influence other kinds of national security powers the executive
242
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relies on.247 Developing the legal framework, and ensuring it complies with our
constitutional values, is imperative.
The case of Secretary of State for the Home Department v. JJ is an example
of the Law Lords clearly asserting and exercising their unique institutional authority
to define Convention rights, liberty, and the level of restraint that amounts to a
deprivation of a right, rather than an interference with an interest.248 The relevant
legal question in JJ was what amounts to a deprivation?249 It was more easily
distinguished from mixed questions of policy, expertise and law, i.e., what kind of
a risk does the defendant pose and what measures would be sufficient to counter
that risk? Once the court determined that an 18-hour curfew constitutes a
deprivation, and not just a restriction of liberty, the legal standard was set. The
distinct question of just how long of a curfew would be sufficient for security
purposes is then up to the legislature to set, and the executive to decide on a caseby-case basis. In this case, Parliament came to impose a limit of 10 hours for a
curfew.250
The Court has also used its authority to identify and defend fair trial rights.
In many of the control measure cases the government relied on evidence it was not
willing to produce in open court.251 Whether it was the risk of exposing intelligence
assets and methods, or respecting conditions of intelligence sharing with foreign
intelligence services, there was often some closed material the controlee did not
know about.252 Closed material procedures, which existed in other contexts prior to
the control measures framework, allowed the Secretary of State to present
evidence—disclosure of which would be contrary to the public interest— to the
court in a closed session where the controlee and the public could not hear the
evidence submitted.253 This procedure raised serious fair trial concerns. For one, it
is a basic principle of fair process that the evidence must be put to the opposing
party so it can be challenged and tested, as there is concern that “[e]vidence which
has been insulated from challenge may positively mislead.” 254 Uncontested
evidence also allows the party submitting it considerable advantage in controlling
just how the evidence is presented and perceived. 255 The use of the special advocate
247
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was meant to ameliorate these dangers. A special advocate would be chosen by the
controlee from a group of security-cleared barristers. While the special advocate
can hear the closed material and represent the interests of the controlled person in
the closed hearings, once the evidence is submitted in closed session, the advocate
is not permitted to speak with the controlee, to take instructions, or to ask for an
alibi or where to find evidence of an alternative narrative. 256 These procedures
raised serious article 6 fair trial concerns.
The House of Lords first came to analyze the use of closed hearings in the
control order regime in MB.257 Lord Bingham’s opinion adopted a contextual and
flexible standard, informed by article 6 and common law fair trial principles, but
adaptable enough to safeguard the substance of the procedural right without formal
and rigid rules. Lord Bingham reasoned that the civil limb of article 6 requires that
the controlee be provided “such knowledge, in whatever form, of what was said
against him as was necessary to enable him, with or without a special advocate,
effectively to challenge or rebut the case against him.” 258 Maintaining that link
between institutional power of the judiciary and fundamental principle of liberty,
Lord Bingham wrote, “the application of the civil limb of article 6(1) does in my
opinion entitle such person to such measure of procedural protection as is
commensurate with the gravity of the potential consequences.” 259 Unwilling to say
to what extent the use of a special advocate provided a sufficient measure of an
opportunity to “challenge or rebut the case” writ large,260 Lord Bingham left open
the question of how much disclosure was required for case by case assessment. In
some circumstances the special advocate would be able to effectively challenge the
case; in others, the open materials would contain enough information to provide the
controlee the opportunity to answer the case against him. 261
Ultimately, with the Grand Chamber judgement in A v United Kingdom, the
European Court of Human Rights settled the matter and the House of Lords adopted
the legal standard in AF (No. 3) that “the controlee must be given sufficient
information about the allegations against him to enable him to give effective
instructions in relation to those allegations.” 262 The adopted standard is similar to
the one set out by Lord Bingham in MB.263 However, the main difference is that
found the challenged evidence reliable after an ex parte, in camera review of the source material. . .
. As official government records, intelligence reports receive a rebuttable ‘presumption of
regularity,’ even when they include layered hearsay information from non-governmental sources.”).
256
See Anderson, supra at note 192, ¶ 3.71.
257
See Secretary of State for the Home Department v. MB [2007] UKHL 46 [50]-[55], [2008] 1 AC
440 (Bingham LJ).
258
Id. at [34]
259
Id. at [24]; see also Secretary of State for the Home Department v. GG, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 786,
[2010] QB 585 [12] (Sedley LJ).
260
Id. at [32]–[35].
261
See id.
262
Secretary of State for the Home Department v. AF (No. 3) [2009] UKHL 28 [59], [2010] 2 AC
269 (Phillips LJ) (following the judgement of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human
Rights in A v. United Kingdom, 2009-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 137 (2009)).
263
See MB [2008] at [41], [43] (Bingham LJ).

48

Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 12

while Lord Bingham’s opinion left it possible for a control order to be upheld, if
most of the evidence was presented in closed session, the AF (No. 3) standard
foreclosed this option. AF (No. 3) makes it a categorical article 6 violation to deny
a controlee a sufficient understanding of the evidence against him. 264
Even when the decision turns on the application of the proportionality
standard, emphasis on the Convention principles at stake can shape judicial
analysis, either by reference to another Convention right, as was the case in
Belmarsh or by strengthening standards of scrutiny through weight and importance
ascribed to given individual interest at stake, i.e., the importance of the right to
liberty.265 In Belmarsh, when the House of Lords analyzed the decision to derogate
from article 5 of the ECHR, it explained and defended the exercise of judicial power
and level of scrutiny in terms of the substantive rights and interests at stake.266 The
court relied on article 14 (discrimination) to give structure and shape to the
necessity prong of the proportionality test and to exercise heightened scrutiny. 267
The courts have been able to accomplish what they have, in no small part,
because of the flexibility of the proportionality standard.268 As the U.S. courts
sought to provide definitions, standards, and categories, the U.K. courts employed
the contextual proportionality standard to weigh the interests in each case. What is
distinctly useful about the proportionality test in this context is that it allows
security and expertise to be directly and openly considered along with the liberty
interests at stake. Proportionality “does not camouflage judicial lawmaking.
Properly employed, it requires courts to acknowledge and defend—honestly and
openly—the policy choices that they make when they make constitutional
choices.”269 In practice, the judiciary is not always able to clearly confront the pull
of executive claims of authority over national security.270 However, the U.K. courts
have managed to protect the link between the formal doctrine and the substantive
values and principles that justify their use.
The more we move from House of Lords decisions to lower court decisions,
conducting review within the parameters set by the highest court, the greater the
See A v. United Kingdom, 2009-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 137, 233–235 (2009) (“in the circumstances of
the present case, and in view of the dramatic impact of the lengthy—and what appeared at that time
to be indefinite—deprivation of liberty on the applicants’ fundamental rights, Article 5 § 4 must
import substantially the same fair-trial guarantees as Article 6 § 1in its criminal aspect.”)
265
See id.; see also Secretary of State for the Home Department v. JJ [2007] UKHL 45 [27], [2007]
3 W.L.R. 642 (Bingham LJ).
266
See A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 AC 68, [100]
(Hope LJ) (“It is impossible ever to overstate the importance of the right to liberty in a democracy.”).
267
See id. at [45]–[73].
268
See Mark Elliott, From Bifurcation to Calibration: Twin-Track Deference and the Culture of
Justification, in Hanna Wilberg & Mark Elliott (eds.) THE SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF SUBSTANTIVE
JUDICIAL REVIEW: TRAVERSING TAGGART’S RAINBOW 61, 87–89 (2015); Julian Rivers,
Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review, 65(1) CAMBRIDGE L. J. 174, 202 (2006).
269
Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72, 77 (2008).
270
See, e.g., A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, [2005], 2 AC 68
[29] (deferring to executive judgement on the existence of the public emergency).
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overlap between executive and judicial institutional competencies. Three of the
main cases concerning the executive’s detention and coercion powers by The House
of Lords decisions were A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,271
Secretary of State for the Home Department v. MB; AF,272 and Secretary of State
for the Home Department v. JJ.273 Each involved a decision about a particular legal
definition or a clarification of a legal standard to guide lower courts in carrying out
their review. The lower court decisions, in contrast, are not generally concerned
with defining liberty or what fair trial standards require, but with carrying out
contextual review based on established standards. 274 Here, the virtue of flexibility
must confront its own vices.275
Contextual engagement presents its own set of constitutional and
institutional challenges. When matters of policy, expertise and law are entangled,
the courts risk undermining judicial authority by failing to elaborate and justify the
exercise of the judicial power. 276 The criticism often falls on the flexible nature of
the proportionality standard, and the particularly malleable final step: narrow
proportionality. Lord Justice Laws, writing in Miranda, made the following
observation about narrow proportionality:
It appears to require the court, in a case where the impugned measure passes
muster [on the first three criteria of the proportionality standard], to decide whether
the measure, though it has a justified purpose and is no more intrusive than
necessary, is nevertheless offensive because it fails to strike the right balance
between private right and public interest; and the court is the judge of where the
balance should lie. I think there is real difficulty in distinguishing this from a
political question to be decided by the elected arm of government. If it is properly
within the judicial sphere, it must be on the footing that there is a plain case.277
To the extent that the U.K. courts have been able to provide a plain case for
asserting judicial scrutiny and challenging executive decision-making, they have
done in two ways. Courts often will focus on the first three steps of the
271

See A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, [2005], 2 AC 68.
See Secretary of State for the Home Department v. MB; AF [2007] UKHL 46 [2007] 3 W.L.R.
681.
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See Secretary of State for the Home Department v. JJ [2007] UKHL 45, [2007] 3 W.L.R. 642.
274
See, e.g., BF v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWHC 2329 (Admin)
[34]–[38] (analyzing the specific circumstances of BFs case); Secretary of State for the Home
Department v. LG & ORS [2017] EWHC 1529(Admin) [85]–[118].
275
See Tom Hickman, Problems for Proportionality, 2010 N.Z. L. REV. 303, 316 (2010) (identifying
the variability of proportionality and different characterizations of the virtue, and flaws, of that
flexibility).
276
See T.R.S. ALLAN, LAW, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH
CONSTITUTIONALISM, 8 (1994) (Even if “[executive and judicial] discretions are complementary,
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Miranda v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWHC (Admin) 255 [40] (Laws
J); see also Bank Mellat v. HM Treasury (No. 2) [2013] UKSC 39 [71].
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proportionality standard.278 Alternatively, when the decision rests on the final step
of proportionality, courts will articulate a principled, and factually substantiated,
reason for why the measure is not proportionate given the individual rights at
stake.279 Nevertheless, the breadth of factors that can shape judicial reasoning and
prompt either deference or scrutiny raises questions about predictability and
consistency.280
Judicial tests that allow for a great deal of flexibility and contextualism may
compromise judicial legitimacy, by failing to articulate the distinctly judicial
function involved in reviewing executive decision making. 281 When there is no
clean way to separate the assessment that a certain harm is likely to result from a
failure to detain or control a person from the decision that the risk of the harm is
proportionate to the interference in a right, is judicial decision making
distinguishable from executive decision making?282 And if it is not, given the
subject matter, what legitimizes the exercise of the judicial power? 283 This shows
how the flexibility of the proportionality standard is in danger of becoming a
double-edged sword: on the one hand, proportionality plus deference supports the
use of a mechanism for weighing rights and institutional powers; on the other hand,
the resulting flexibility risks collapsing judicial decision-making into something
unpredictable, which could erode the constitutional case for judicial
involvement.284
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See Julian Rivers, Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review, 65(1) CAMBRIDGE L.J. 174,
192–93 (2006) (“The alternative ‘correctness-conception’ of Convention rights assumes that the
doctrine of proportionality provides just one right answer to every decision within the scope of
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judgement on the part of other public authorities lies in the perceived need to prevent the collapse
of supervisory jurisdiction into a fully-fledged review of the merits of every case.”).
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(2008); TOM HICKMAN, PUBLIC LAW AFTER THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 57 (2010); Elliott, supra note
171, at 4.
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See generally Julian Rivers, Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review, 65(1) CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 174, 201 (2006) (“We probably do not believe in complete incommensurability between
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C. Constitutionally Valuable Legislative Engagement
Having identified standards and interventions available to the judiciary, this
section identifies changes the legislature can make to legal authorization in
response to judicial holdings. The section lays out Parliamentary responses and
details how each new legislative authorization incorporated or responded to
constitutional flaws the courts identified. While Parliament did not refine the
definition of terrorism, it did change—and in fact, reduce—the power it granted to
the executive. Parliament also imposed procedural limits meant to protect
convention rights.
The legislature sits in a privileged, and tricky, position. It is the branch
charged with enacting laws and translating complex political, legal, and practical
considerations and compromises into a text. It has a great deal of power to decide
the nation’s approach. Confronted with the threat of international terrorism, a
legislature can decide: (1) who to target; (2) how the state should go after them,
what kinds of powers; (3) where the state’s response should be focused, or where
it cannot go; (4) how long the authorized framework should be in place; and 5) what
diplomatic, foreign relations, or other considerations may counsel caution, etc. 285
Each choice above entails an enumerable number of options and additional
decisions. Take (2) for example, the decision of how the state should respond to
this threat and what kind of powers it should authorize. The legislature could
authorize (1) deadly force, (2) indefinite detention, (3) control measures, (4) asset
freezing, (5) deportation/exclusion, (6) criminalization/prosecution, (7) military
prosecution, (8) prevention programs (PVCE), (9) citizenship stripping, or (10)
enhanced surveillance, among other options. 286 The legislature can choose all of
these, some of these, or something else altogether. Some decisions will overlap with
executive power and expertise and require policy input, while others, and the
practice that results from them, will overlap with judicial competencies and require
guidance from the courts. Each overlay raises different considerations for the
legislature.
Constitutional scholars often look to the legislature as the institution most
capable of and constitutionally empowered to place limits on executive power and
safeguard the rule of law. 287 This emphasis on legislative power and prerogative
pays insufficient attention to the institutional costs the legislature pays for
intervening in matters of national security. 288 The norm tends to be legislative
285
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disengagement or allowance of vast discretion for a number of reasons. For one, it
is difficult to articulate clear rules and definitions governing current national
security and counterterrorism issues.289 This is not only because terms tend to be
vague or general but also because there is an unshakable fear among lawmakers of
failing to provide a necessary power to the government simply because we cannot
imagine or predict circumstances that require it.290 Where prediction fails,
discretion allows the national security officials to react (or act) effectively. 291 For
another, the political costs of setting sharp and clear limits are high, especially when
there is no price to pay for failing to do so since those impacted hold no political
power.292
How much can judicial scrutiny push the legislature to provide better
guidance and a clearer definition of conduct and scope of executive authority? Put
another way, if one of the main concerns with legislation in this counterterrorism
context is the lack of clear and detailed law authorizing these powers, then the aim
is to prod the legislature to set some parameters or limits on that power. Current
legislation creates great latitude, perhaps necessarily and certainly not uniquely in
this context, delegating a significant amount of law-making power.293 But the
power granted and claimed is a profoundly consequential one; for the people it is
used against, it is a power of great control and violence. 294 The authorizing
legislation should look for and provide limits for how that power should be used or
mechanisms for ensuring the power is not exercised arbitrarily, erroneously, or

See, e.g., Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority
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unjustifiably. The less law there is to limit and guide the executive, the greater need
there will be for judicial oversight.295
Consider what the U.K. Parliament has done in response to judicial review.
Parliament has been unable, or unwilling, to refine a legal definition of terrorism or
terrorism related activity but has found other means of setting limits on executive
power. First, Parliament abandoned the most severe power—detention— and
replaced it with a less restrictive, though still incredibly coercive, intrusive, and
disruptive, approach of control measures.296 Parliament also winnowed the
measures authorized in order to remove their most intrusive powers. They limited
the amount of time a person could be restricted to their home, removed the authority
to force someone to move to a different part of the country, and lessened restrictions
on access to communication and the internet. 297 Parliament also imposed a one year
limit on the duration someone could be placed under control measures, ensuring
that indefinite restriction of liberty on limited evidence would not become the
practice.298 This kind of engagement limited the severity of the authority granted as
a way of mitigating the stakes and balancing interests. Parallel legislative
refinement could be imagined in the U.S. context, perhaps limiting the authority
geographically to active kinetic fields of battle, to enumerated lists of countries, to
individuals in the command structure of named organizations, or to those directly
participating in armed conflict. Similarly, Congress could set temporal limits on
how long someone could be detained without more evidence and rigorous judicial
process. There is a great deal of discretion, freedom, and opportunity to tailor limits
to the circumstances and lessons learned. There is also room to recalibrate how we
balance interests and to change the constitutional calculus by providing better
justifications. Judicial review does not mean the end of this process.299
Take, for example, the issue of relocation orders. Parliament included them
in the statute that first authorized control orders (PTA), finding the authority
necessary to control those suspected of posing an ongoing threat. 300 When the
courts came to review these orders, they did not find this power non-compliant with
295
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the Convention in all circumstances. However, in individual cases, the courts found
the measure too onerous to justify, giving greater weight to individual interests in
these cases than the executive had. 301 When Parliament enacted the TPIM, it
removed these powers.302 Then, the real-world circumstances changed. Several
controlees absconded, raising the need for stronger measures, according to some,
and ISIS emerged as a new and significant threat, drawing recruits from the United
Kingdom to Syria and Iraq. 303 Due to these new circumstances, the government
argued, the need for more significant powers was justified. 304 Convinced,
Parliament gave this power back.305 There is a great deal of disagreement over the
quality and soundness of this reasoning, whether the government needs these
powers, and whether Parliament should have given them back.306 But what it does
demonstrate is the flexibility that exists in the process: the exercise of judicial
power does not foreclose further analysis, learning of lessons, or elaboration of new
and better reasons for public policies and laws. The legislature has several ways it
can respond to a judicial decision that a statute violates the Constitution/convention;
options will vary depending, among other things, on the nature of the judicial
decision and legislative policy goals. 307
The second main type of change Parliament made to the legal framework
was to strengthen the due process and fair trial protections, as a way to mitigate the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of someone’s liberty.308 The influence of judicial
301
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review is obvious and appropriate given the judicial branch’s institutional
competence to determine what fair process entails. But, as was the case with
relocation orders, U.K. courts did not issue a declaration of incompatibility when it
came to the standard of proof or the use of closed evidence. 309 Instead, the courts
made case by case assessments of whether the process provided was sufficient to
give the accused an opportunity to mount a defense. 310 In the process, courts pointed
out the real faults in the system. 311 When Parliament reworked the legal framework,
the fair trail protections were statutorily strengthened.
In the United Kingdom, judicial identification of particularly
constitutionally troubling aspects of the legal regime and practice pushed the
legislature to reconsider and refine the framework. And that is what separation of
powers and judicial review are meant to achieve. 312 A statute may have faults
because it is passed quickly, in response to an emergency before there is time to
consider the full meaning and consequences of the adopted approach. Or a statute
may be constitutionally flawed because the legislature paid insufficient attention to
the constitutional issues or ascribed too little weight to the individual interests
involved. We have an independent branch in the system, that is especially focused
on individual rights and constitutional principles, to point out and correct those
mistakes. The three branches have different, but entangled, competencies, which
are brought to bear (in different but overlapping ways) on the same circumstances,
policies, and acts. Further, the action of one branch, legislative, will impact the
scope of legitimate power of the other, executive or judicial. 313 This is how a system
of separated powers is meant to function.
In the United States, Congress has exercised its power in two ways, neither
of which qualifies as pro-constitutional engagement. Congress passed the NDAA
309
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2012, a fairly empty and purely ‘declarative’ act that does nothing to add
substantive content or limits to the existing, executively defined, framework.314 The
other major Congressional activity has been the series of provisions attached to
multiple appropriation bills limiting the executive’s authority to transfer detainees
out of Guantanamo and to the United States. 315 The former merely seeks to solidify
executive discretion and power; the latter forecloses some executive power, but in
a way that does nothing to lessen the public law problem these powers present, and
may even exacerbate the problem by foreclosing the executive’s power to transfer
detainees.316
IV. Conclusion
On June 10, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case of
Moath al-Alwi, a man detained at Guantanamo since 2002. Justice Breyer,
dissenting from the denial of certiorari, articulated the consequences of the Court’s
failure to take up the question of whether the continued and indefinite detention of
someone under the armed conflict paradigm could still be justified under the
Constitution.317 There is a real chance, he wrote, that al-Alwi will “spend the rest
of his life in detention based on his status as an enemy combatant a generation
ago.”318 The case presented an opportunity for the Court to provide some standards
or draw some lines on the scope of executive authority to detain pursuant to the
AUMF. The Court did not. 319 The D.C. Circuit, understanding the Supreme Court
was unwilling to reengage with the Guantanamo cases, stepped in. Writing for the
court, Judge Rao put an end to the nearly two-decade long debate of whether
Guantanamo detainees are entitled to substantive constitutional protections. 320 The
court held the detainees were not protected by the constitutional guarantee of due
process, explicitly eliminating any substantive constitutional limits on executive
314
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power.321 The D.C. Circuit cited the institutional inaction of Congress and the
Supreme Court as the basis for its holding. 322
It is now over 17 years since the opening of Guantanamo Bay as a detention
site in the War on Terror. U.S. courts, especially the Supreme Court, have yet to
address some of the core constitutional issues raised by the executive practices at
Guantanamo and beyond. The Authorization for the Use of Military Force (2001)
and the NDAA 2012 continue to serve as the main legislative authorizations.
Congress has taken no additional steps to clarify or limit the powers granted to the
executive. The judiciary has failed to scrutinize the legal framework, instead
deferring to executive decisions and standards. As we near the twenty-year
anniversary of September 11th, it may be time to consider what form of judicial
engagement may prompt better legislative engagement, thereby revitalizing the
proper functioning of the separation of powers in the service of constitutional
governance.
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